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POPULATION-BASED SENTENCING 
Jessica M. Eaglin† 
The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at 
sentencing reflects the extension of the academic and policy-
driven push to move judges away from sentencing individual 
defendants and toward basing sentencing on population level 
representations of crimes and offenses. How have courts re-
sponded to this trend?  Drawing on the federal sentencing 
guidelines jurisprudence and the emerging procedural juris-
prudence around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, 
this Article identifies two techniques.  First, the courts have 
expanded individual procedural rights into sentencing where 
they once did not apply.  Second, the courts have created 
procedural rules that preserve the space for judges to pass 
moral judgment on individual defendants.  These responses 
exist in deep tension with policymakers’ goals to shape sen-
tencing outcomes in the abstract.  While courts seek to pre-
serve the sentencing process, advocates encourage the courts 
to manage the population-based sentencing tools.  The courts’ 
response is potentially problematic, as refusal to regulate the 
tools can undermine criminal administration.  However, it 
presents an underexplored opportunity for courts and oppo-
nents of the recent trend toward institutionalizing actuarial 
risk assessments to jointly create the intellectual and policy-
driven space for more fundamental, structural reforms relating 
to the U.S. criminal legal apparatus.  This Article urges the 
courts and legal scholars to consider these alternatives going 
forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law and policymakers increasingly encourage or require 
courts to consider actuarial risk assessment instruments 
(“RAIs,” “risk assessments,” or “tools”) in the felony sentencing 
process.1  These tools standardize the prediction of an individ-
ual’s future behavior based on statistical analyses of historical 
data collected about past offenders’ behavior.2  This develop-
1 See, e.g., TENN. CODE  ANN. § 41-1-412(b) (requiring inclusion of a risk/ 
needs assessment in the presentence reports provided to judges at sentencing); 
individual defendants’ recidivism risk at sentencing in Pennsylvania); 204 Pa. C. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.500(1) (“Except in cases where the defendant shall be 
sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of release 
. . . the court may order the department [of corrections] to complete a risk assess-
ment report” that shall be provided to the court if available before sentencing); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2020) (adopting a statewide actuarial tool to predict 
S. § 305. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft 2017) (encouraging states to institutionalize actuarial risk assessments at 
sentencing). 
2 ANEGELE CHRISTIN, ALEX ROSENBLAT & DANAH BOYD, COURTS AND PREDICTIVE` 
ALGORITHMS 1 (2015), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ 
Courts_and_Predictive_Algorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/79FA-9HAW]. 
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ment has caused great controversy as a matter of public policy 
and scholarly debate.3 
As the tools proliferate at sentencing, scholars try to situ-
ate the trend within traditional sentencing reform frameworks. 
For example, the institutionalization of actuarial risk assess-
ments may reflect the pendulum swing in penal theory toward 
consequentialist, forward-looking reforms rather than the 
backward-looking, retributive reforms that dominated in ear-
lier decades.4  Similarly, it may reflect the expansion of actua-
rial methods in the sentencing process.5  Finally, this trend 
may reflect the expansion of transparent, system-level tools 
that enhance accountability in judicial decision making at 
sentencing.6 
3 The scope of the debate is wide, with a particular interest in the fairness of 
the tool design. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 
2218, (2019) (providing an overview of the debates).  In the particular context of 
post-conviction sentencing, debates are taking a turn toward the courts as much 
scholarship and public discourse has emerged in the wake of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in State v. Loomis, which considered and rejected 
several due process challenges to the use of a proprietary RAI at sentencing.  881 
N.W.2d 749, 769-70 (Wis. 2016). E.g., Michael Brenner et al., Constitutional 
Dimensions of Predictive Algorithms in Criminal Justice, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
267, 278–83 (2020) (critiquing the Loomis decision); Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, 
Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurispru-
dence of Criminal Risk Assessment 15 (Dec. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3306723 [https:// 
perma.cc/3675-H6CL] (commending the Loomis court for addressing risk assess-
ments at sentencing, but critiquing the court for its flawed reasoning); Danielle 
Citron, (Un)fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, FORBES (July 13, 2016, 
3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2016/07/13/unfair-
ness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#309a91754ad2 [https://perma.cc/ 
278X-N72U] (commending the Loomis court for addressing risk assessments, but 
critiquing its approach based on automation bias); see also DANIELLE L. KEHL, 
PRISCILLA GUO & SAMUEL KESSLER, ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: AS-
SESSING THE  USE OF  RISK  ASSESSMENTS AT  SENTENCING 21 (2017), http:// 
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 [https://perma.cc/9D7P-
HTLD] (same). 
4 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing 
and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 586, 592 (2018) (framing opposition to 
actuarial risk assessments as a matter of opposing the consideration of risk at 
sentencing, and emphasizing the theoretical and practical tensions between risk 
and culpability). 
5 To that end, a particular binary around RAIs has emerged—between accu-
racy and fairness in the metrics that shape an assessment—upon which scholars 
and policymakers divide, and cannot agree.  For exemplary scholarship on RAIs 
and equal protection doctrine, see Mayson, supra note 3, at 2262–81 (2019) 
(critiquing different interpretations of fairness metrics in RAI design); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1056–57, 
1101–02 (2019) (critiquing the limits of equal protection doctrine in ensuring 
“racially just” algorithms in criminal administration). 
6 Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 
445 (2020) (“to change [judicial] behavior, it is not enough to adopt a technical 
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Each of these frames offers important insight to this mo-
ment.  Yet, together or alone, each is insufficient to conceptual-
ize the broader transformation in the nature of sentencing 
within which these tools make sense.  While that transforma-
tion relates to the shifting orientation of punishment theory, it 
also pertains to the kind of knowledge we expect judges to 
prioritize at sentencing.7  Similarly, a focus on technological 
advances in the tools’ design take for granted the social 
changes that accompany it,8 including to the way we expect 
judges to think at sentencing.  Finally, thinking about actuarial 
risk assessments through a focus on transparency, accounta-
bility, and bureaucratic structure can obscure how efforts to 
make judicial sentencing transparent through creation of tech-
nical infrastructure have also, in turn, transformed the act of 
sentencing for judges.  As a result, actuarial risk assessments 
are proliferating into sentencing processes, yet we lack a way to 
fully conceptualize the significance of this development in his-
torical and sociological context.9  This absence, in turn, limits 
the scope of critique and constrains our imagination of poten-
tial pathways forward in light of this development in this his-
torical moment.  Accordingly, this Article seeks to expand the 
frame. 
tool—attitudes towards the use of risk assessment in decision-making need to be 
addressed if the tool is to be used well.”); Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at 
Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 68, 70–71 (2017) (noting that “[r]isk-based prison 
policy is as American as apple pie” and urging its “domestication” because “it is 
appalling that it has been administered with so little transparency or 
accountability”). 
7 KATJA  FRANKO AAS, SENTENCING IN THE  AGE OF  INFORMATION: FROM FAUST TO 
MACINTOSH 67 (2005) (“The struggles over the exercise of sentencing discretion are 
. . . struggles about the format and nature of knowledge”); Malcolm M. Feeley & 
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections 
and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 454 (1992) (noting that “the emphasis 
on the systemic and on formal rationality” definitive of the new penology occurred 
independent of the “pendulum swings of penal attitudes”). 
8 Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 589 (2019) (warning that the advance of technical reforms at 
sentencing distort social conceptions related to punishment and mass incarcera-
tion) [hereinafter Eaglin, Technologically Distorted]; see generally BERNARD E. HAR-
COURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 
188–92 (2007) (warning that the advance of the actuarial distorts social concep-
tions of punishment). 
9 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167 (2001) (“[W]hen considering the [crime control] field as 
a whole, we need to bear in mind that these new practices and mentalities co-exist 
with the residues and continuations of older arrangements. . . . History is not the 
replacement of the old by the new, but the more or less extensive modification of 
one by the other.”). 
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This Article asserts that the institutionalization of actuarial 
risk assessments at sentencing reflects the extension of a 
larger, historically situated push to move judges away from 
passing moral judgment on individual defendants and toward 
basing sentencing on population-level representations of 
crimes and offenses.  This trend exists in deep tension with the 
aims and design of the traditional sentencing process.  Courts 
address that tension through procedural sentencing jurispru-
dence.  This Article draws on the federal sentencing guidelines 
jurisprudence and the emerging jurisprudence around actua-
rial risk assessments at sentencing to illuminate the ongoing 
tension between courts and RAI advocates in this moment. 
Further, by situating the jurisprudence in the frame of popula-
tion-based sentencing, it identifies obscured possibilities in the 
jurisprudence worthy of further exploration in the literature 
going forward. 
The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at 
sentencing encourages judges to engage in population-based 
sentencing.  It substantiates a larger academic and policy-
driven push for judges to sentence based on surface, popula-
tion-level representations of crimes and offenders rather than 
to pass moral judgment based on an understanding of individ-
ual defendants at sentencing.  This development fits within a 
larger, historical shift that creates tensions with the traditional 
sentencing process.  While that process is designed for judges 
to pass moral judgment on individual defendants, much about 
the nature of sentencing changed in the late twentieth century. 
Sentencing reforms like sentencing guidelines encouraged 
judges to base sentences not on the peculiar characteristics of 
the offender and the offense, but population level representa-
tions of the crime.10  Actuarial risk assessments do the same, 
by further abstracting the offender through population-level 
representations.11  By describing RAIs as part of the trend to-
ward population-based sentencing, this Article provides a way 
to conceptualize important continuities between this develop-
ment and the history of sentencing that may otherwise be 
concealed. 
The Article uses the population-based sentencing frame to 
offer new insight to the emerging jurisprudence around the use 
of actuarial risk assessments in state courts.  Drawing on the 
jurisprudence that developed around the federal sentencing 
guidelines for insight, this Article identifies two techniques that 
10 See infra subpart I.A. 
11 See infra subpart I.B. 
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the courts employ when responding to the trend toward popu-
lation-based sentencing.  First, the courts have expanded indi-
vidual defendants’ procedural rights when a population-based 
sentencing tool is implemented in a way that directly reduces a 
judge’s ability to pass moral judgment on individual defend-
ants at sentencing.12  To the extent that defendants and schol-
ars ask courts to recognize new individual rights at sentencing 
now in the face of actuarial risk assessments’ expansion, state 
courts likely have not done so because the tools have not been 
implemented in a way that reduces the potential for judges to 
pass moral judgment at sentencing.13  Second, the courts have 
responded to the trend toward population-based sentencing by 
creating procedural rules that create the space for judges to 
continue to pass moral judgment on individual defendants at 
sentencing.14  Some state courts have created new procedural 
rules to preserve this space through the jurisprudence on actu-
arial risk assessments at sentencing; others would carve out 
that space without a new rule.15 
There is a tension between the techniques courts adopt 
and the trend toward population-based sentencing.  While 
courts try to preserve the traditional sentencing process and 
maintain the space for judges to pass moral judgment on indi-
vidual defendants, scholars and advocates encourage courts to 
start managing the population-based tools through the sen-
tencing process.16  The courts are not doing this.  We can un-
derstand this trend in the jurisprudence as perilous, and for 
good reason.  Population-based tools influence judges; the 
tools often lack important oversight in their design; and their 
orientation around prevention threatens to frustrate traditional 
criminal justice values.17  This Article suggests that the trend 
in the jurisprudence presents obscured promise, too.  Main-
taining the sentencing process and preserving the space for 
judges to keep passing judgment on individual defendants in 
social context is itself a critique of the political and cultural 
assumptions that sustain the trend toward population-based 
sentencing.18  This critique can align with the deeper, struc-
tural critiques that many opponents to RAIs raise in the era of 
12 See infra subpart II.A. 
13 See infra subpart II.B. 
14 See infra subpart III.A. 
15 See infra subpart III.B. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 See infra subpart IV.A. 
18 See infra subpart IV.B. 
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mass incarceration.  This Article invites scholars to think more 
critically about these possibilities going forward. 
This contribution provides new insight to both the litera-
ture on RAIs and the literature on mass incarceration.  While 
there is much interest in how the courts’ respond to RAIs at 
sentencing, scholarship tends to orient around the tools’ de-
sign.19  Analyzing the jurisprudence through a historically- and 
sociologically-rich lens focused on sentencing invites scholars 
to think more broadly about the significance of the emerging 
jurisprudence in this historical moment.  While RAIs’ oppo-
nents launch policy-driven and equal-protection based criti-
ques of the tools as a response to mass incarceration, they can 
overlook the possibilities in the procedural jurisprudence 
around population-level sentencing.20  This Article invites RAI 
critics to see the emerging state sentencing jurisprudence as a 
foundation to critique this historical present.  By framing this 
development as part of the trend toward population-based sen-
tencing, it foregrounds the qualitatively different kind of sen-
tencing process grounded in human judgment of individual 
offenders that judges try to preserve, but lack the vocabulary to 
articulate.  Further, it encourages courts and scholars to see 
the trend toward population-based sentencing as a political 
and cultural act that only makes sense in a particular social 
context defined not by mass incarceration, but structural inse-
curity.21  The Article urges critical reflection on this social real-
ity going forward, and illuminates the way that the 
jurisprudence creates space for such reflection. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the 
historical foundation of the sentencing process, and situates 
actuarial risk assessments within the larger trend toward pop-
19 See, e.g., Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279 (“The question is whether this 
‘black box’ methodology [in actuarial risk assessments] violates the due process 
rights of criminal defendants by denying them the opportunity to challenge their 
output risk scores, or the means by which those scores were calculated.”). 
20 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806, and 816 n.50 (2014) 
(arguing that relying on actuarial risk assessments at sentencing “amounts to 
overt discrimination” and violates the Equal Protection Clause and dismissing the 
potential of the Sixth Amendment to address the equality-based concerns with the 
design of actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing).  For a recent exception 
to this assertion, see Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. 
611 (2020) [hereinafter Huq, Human Decision].  While his exploration of the Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence centers on its implications for the individual’s right to 
a human reviewer of increasingly complex, automated government decisions, see 
id. at 617, this Article is concerned with how the courts use individual rights to 
resituate and assert the judge’s role as decision maker at sentencing. 
21 GARLAND, supra note 9, at 168. 
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ulation-based sentencing.  Part II demonstrates that courts ex-
pand individual defendants’ procedural rights at sentencing in 
response to this trend.  Part III demonstrates that courts create 
procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to pass moral 
judgment on individual defendants in the face of this trend. 
Part IV identifies the tension between how courts are respond-
ing to actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, and how advo-
cates of the trend want courts to respond to the tools.  It 
identifies perils in this tension.  It also identifies a yet underex-
plored interest convergence between courts and RAIs’ oppo-
nents illuminated by the jurisprudence and worthy of further 
exploration going forward. 
I 
THE HISTORICAL PRESENT 
A. Procedure Light Sentencing and the Move toward 
Population-Based Sentencing 
For most of the twentieth century, states and the federal 
government maintained discretionary sentencing structures.22 
In a typical discretionary structure, a judge would conduct a 
sentencing hearing separate from the defendant’s trial of con-
viction.23  At the sentencing hearing, the judge would receive 
information about the defendant’s personal background, their 
criminal history, and details about the offense through a 
presentence report before imposing an individualized sentence 
tailored to the defendant.24  The judge was constrained by the 
statutory sentencing range—meaning the sentence could not 
fall above the statutory maximum or the statutory minimum 
set by the legislature—but those ranges were typically quite 
broad.25  A parole board would determine the actual amount of 
time a defendant served.26 
Under this structure, the entire sentencing process was 
“predicated on the fundamental understanding” that a judge 
would pass moral judgment upon each individual defendant.27 
22 Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 
377, 382, 392–93 (2005). 
23 Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentenc-
ing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 190 (2014).  For a brief history of presentence 
reports in both state and federal courts, see John P. Higgins, Confidentiality of 
Presentence Reports, 28 ALB. L. REV. 12, 12–13 (1964). 
24 See id. 
25 Id. 
26 Chanenson, supra note 22, at 384–85. 
27 KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 78-82 (1998) (describing the sentencing process in the federal 
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Accordingly, judges retained broad sentencing discretion and 
defendants, in turn, enjoyed minimal procedural protections.28 
Williams v. New York is the emblematic decision on this 
point.29  There, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a due process 
challenge to a sentence based on concerns that the judge con-
sidered out-of-court statements contrary to the defendant’s 
right to confront his accusers.30  The decision was grounded in 
the rehabilitative ideal.31  It emphasized that procedural pro-
tections were counterproductive to the individualizing, discre-
tionary act of sentencing.32 
At the end of the twentieth century, law and policymakers 
radically transformed sentencing.  The process itself remained 
the same—sentencing hearings continued and defendants still 
enjoyed minimal procedural rights—but the nature of sentenc-
ing changed.  The rehabilitative ideal as a guiding theory of 
punishment declined.33  The idea of judges passing moral judg-
ment upon individual defendants became a thing to fear rather 
than a thing to celebrate.34  Policymakers across the country 
system before creation of sentencing guidelines as one “predicated on the funda-
mental understanding that only a person can pass moral judgment, and only a 
person can be morally judged.”). 
28 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 190–91. 
29 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
30 Id. at 251. 
31 Id. at 248–49 (“Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become 
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.  Modern changes in the treatment of 
offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for observance of the 
distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and sentencing processes.”). 
32 Id. at 249 (“Under the practice of individualizing punishments, investiga-
tional techniques have been given an important role.”). 
33 Empirical research and scholarship also emerged in this time period that 
critiqued rehabilitation. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions 
and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974).  For a recent account of 
the decline then transformation in notions of rehabilitation in criminal adminis-
tration, see Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 517–23.  Notably, 
the intellectual foundation for the change in sentencing emerged through a turn 
away from rehabilitation toward retribution-oriented policies. See ANDREW VON 
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 41-42 (1976) (advocating a turn 
from rehabilitation to “just deserts”).  The idea was that such a turn would reduce 
criminal incarceration sentences. Id. at 43 (suggesting the turn would create a 
foundation to “set reasonable limits to the extent of punishment”).  In reality, it 
did not.  Incarceration in the United States soared starting in the 1970s until 
2009. See E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 fig. 1 (2014) (showing the increase 
in state and federal prison populations between 1978 and 2009). 
34 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 17 (“The reformers of our day fear that 
discretion leads to unduly disparate sentences for similar crimes by similar of-
fenders.”). The broad discretion allocated to judges in a discretionary sentencing 
structure came under attack from the left and the right. From the left, critics 
argued that sentencing outcomes were arbitrary, and from the right, critics ar-
gued that sentencing outcomes were too lenient. See NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST 
CIVIL  RIGHT: HOW  LIBERALS  BUILT  PRISON  AMERICA 108–11 (2014) (discussing the 
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implemented sentencing reforms to constrain judicial sentenc-
ing discretion.  For example, states and the federal government 
expanded mandatory minimum penalties.35  These statutes re-
quired particular sentence outcomes, usually to a term in 
prison, based on specific factors present in the commission of 
an offense.36  Several states and the federal government also 
created sentencing guidelines.37  Under the guidelines, crimi-
nal statutes remained the same, meaning broad ranges existed 
for most offenses of conviction, but legislatures and commis-
sions narrowed the range within which judges were expected to 
sentence an individual based on predetermined administrative 
diktats concerning the offense and the offender’s criminal 
history.38 
These reforms encouraged or required judges to sentence 
based on population-level representations of criminal offenses. 
These reforms tried to fix sentences well in advance of the 
instant case.  Sentencing guidelines, in particular, introduced 
a “large degree of impersonality” to the sentencing process by 
focusing the judge’s attention on the “nomenclature of crimes” 
rather than the social context of their commission.39  Following 
Professor David Garland, these sentencing reforms “rendered 
[the offender] more and more abstract, more and more stere-
otypical, more and more a projected image rather than an indi-
viduated person.”40  In so doing, guidelines, like other 
sentencing reforms of that moment, “extended the distance be-
tween the effective sentencer (in reality, the legislature or the 
sentencing commission) and the person upon whom the sen-
tence is imposed.”41  In effect, “the individualization of sentenc-
ing [gave] way to a kind of ‘punishment-at-a-distance’” wherein 
judges were less likely to sentence based on “the peculiar facts 
of the case and the individual characteristics of the offender.”42 
shortcomings in “disparity” as a basis for sentencing reform in the federal 
system). 
35 Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Prac-
tices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN  WESTERN COUNTRIES 229 (Michael Tonry & 
Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 222, 225–26 tbl. 6.1 (describing the commission and guidelines 
approach to sentencing reform throughout the states). 
38 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 190. 
39 AAS, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
40 GARLAND, supra note 9, at 179. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991) (identifying “the 
movement from individualized to aggregated sentences” embodied by guideline 
regimes in federal and state systems and arguing that this trend “has marked a 
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These population-based sentencing reforms raised concern 
that procedural protections, once scant at sentencing, had be-
come necessary.43  Despite initial resistance in cases like Mc-
Millan v. Pennsylvania,44 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 
series of decisions in the 2000s that would bring more consti-
tutional criminal procedure to bear on noncapital sentencing.45 
The Court subsequently ruled that procedural protections de-
pend on the kind of sentencing structure a jurisdiction 
maintains.46 
Thus, procedural rights in the noncapital felony sentencing 
context remain minimal.47  Some procedural protections apply 
to all convicted persons regardless of the sentencing structure. 
For example, the right to counsel and the due process right to 
be heard apply to persons convicted of felonies in all jurisdic-
tions.48  In a “mandatory” sentencing structure, where sen-
tence outcomes are “specif[ied] . . . based on particular facts,” 
defendants have additional procedural protections.49  These in-
clude the right to a jury determining sentencing facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt if that fact is necessary to impose a higher 
sentence than could be imposed under either the statute or the 
guidelines in the absence of that fact,50 and the right to notice 
backward step in the search for just criminal punishments.”) [hereinafter Al-
schuler, Failure of Sentencing Guidelines]; Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, 
or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723, 734–35 (1993) (emphasizing his critique of 
data-driven, state sentencing guidelines). 
43 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentenc-
ing: The Constitutional Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence”, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 147, 157 (1993) (“The absence of procedural protections may well 
have been reasonable when sentencing was not a truly legal decision.  In a discre-
tionary sentencing scheme dominated by at least a rhetoric of rehabilitation, the 
sentence was not a product of any findings of fact about the nature of the offense, 
but rather a product of the judge’s intuition about the defendant’s prospects for 
rehabilitation. . . .  The current situation is quite different.”). 
44 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236–37 (2005) (recogniz-
ing that the introduction of sentencing guidelines created “new circumstances” 
that led the Court to the answer new questions of procedure “developed in Ap-
prendi and subsequent cases.”). 
46 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 188. 
47 Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1775–78 
(2003) (arguing that the volume of procedural trial rights applicable at sentencing 
further the goal of a “best estimate” in sentencing); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. 
Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
47 (2011) (building on Michaels’ “best estimate” framework). 
48 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (right to counsel); Glover v. 
United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (right to effective assistance of 
counsel). 
49 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 188. 
50 Booker, 543 U.S.  at 230. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 12 16-FEB-21 10:52
364 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:353 
of facts that a judge will consider to enhance the sentence.51 
The ex post facto clause applies in such structures as well.52 
The rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing, though courts 
generally adhere to some minimal expectations of relevance 
and reliability in the evidence considered.53 
B. Actuarial Risk Assessments as the Extension of 
Population-Based Sentencing 
Today, law and policymakers are embracing the institu-
tionalization of actuarial risk assessment instruments into 
state sentencing processes across the country.  These tools 
standardize the prediction of an individual’s future behavior 
based on statistical analyses of historical data on past offend-
ers’ behavior.  RAI developers identify statistical correlations 
between group traits and group criminal offending rates to se-
lect objective predictive risk factors.54  Common predictive fac-
tors that enhance a defendant’s risk score include criminal 
history, age, gender, and socioeconomic factors like education, 
family ties, and antisocial behavior.55  Actuarial instruments— 
whether produced as a checklist or through a computer-gener-
ated survey—use the presence of select predictive risk factors 
to assess the likelihood that a person will engage in criminal 
behavior defined as “recidivism” in the future.56  Rather than 
communicate the assessment as a statistical number, most 
tools offer a qualitative assessment.57  Thus, tools tend to clas-
sify persons as low-, medium-, or high-risk of engaging in cer-
tain future behavior.58 
51 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991). 
52 Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 543–44 (2013). 
53 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (evidentiary rules do not apply to sentencing 
proceedings); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3 cmt. (“In resolving any 
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court 
may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the 
rule of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”).  State courts maintain 
similar expectations. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 400.15(7)(a) (McKinney) 
(providing restrictions on sentencing evidence in New York). 
54 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISH-
ING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 17–18 (2007) (emphasizing that actuarial risk assessments 
“rely on statistical correlations between a group trait and that group’s criminal 
offending rate” to “determine criminal justice outcomes for particular individuals 
within those groups”). 
55 Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Chal-
lenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 240–41 (2015). 
56 Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 68 & 
n.41 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing]. 
57 Id. at 86. 
58 Id. at 86–87. 
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Like earlier efforts to formalize judicial decision making, 
these tools encourage judges to engage in population-based 
sentencing.  Their expansion prioritizes “a certain mode of 
thinking [at sentencing] which is based on working on the sur-
face, rather than on in-depth understanding.”59  Actuarial risk 
assessments do not convey information about the circum-
stances that bring a defendant into the courtroom nor what 
that individual will do after sentencing, whether incarcerated 
or not.  Rather, it provides a static prediction of the likelihood 
that populations similarly situated to the defendant would en-
gage in future behavior at the moment the assessment is ad-
ministered.60  Thus, like guidelines before them, this 
population-based sentencing tool obscures the peculiar facts of 
the case and the individual characteristics of the actual of-
fender appearing before a judge.  While earlier reforms en-
couraged judges to base sentencing decisions on population-
level representations of crime, the institutionalization of actua-
rial risk assessments abstracts through population-level repre-
sentations of the offender. 
Thus, sentencing guidelines and actuarial risk assess-
ments share important similarities, but also differ in significant 
ways.  Though both mandatory minimums and sentencing 
guidelines contained an element of prediction in their design, 
actuarial risk assessments enhance that feature.61  Like sen-
tencing guidelines, RAIs are meant to constrain judicial discre-
tion without changing sentence statutes.  Unlike many 
guidelines that were implemented to shape sentence outcomes 
directly, to date, RAIs “reduce discretion, not in a direct way 
but by ‘nudging’ judges, prosecutors, and other court staff to 
59 AAS, supra note 7, at 5. 
60 Numerous RAIs exist, and a variety of tools appear at sentencing.  Some 
tools predict future arrest and others predict future conviction. Eaglin, Construct-
ing, supra note 56, at 71–72.  While most tools predict future behavior, newer 
tools may assess a person’s “risk-needs” as well.  See Hamilton, supra note 55, at 
238–39 (describing “fourth generation” risk-needs-responsivity assessments). 
While these newer tools rely on “dynamic,” meaning mutable, risk factors, the 
prediction itself is static.  Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4, at 593 (urging the use 
of risk assessments that use “dynamic, or ‘causal risk factors,’ such as drug 
abuse or impulsivity” because “these are risk factors that can be changed through 
intervention and thus focus on traits that the person can do something about.”). 
61 Many states already use criminal history as a crude predictor of risk in 
their state sentencing structures.  See HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 88–100 (2007); 
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 67–68; Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior 
Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End of Prior-Conviction Exception to 
Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 539–46 (2014). For a discussion of the ascen-
dance in actuarial thinking more broadly in criminal administration, see generally 
HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 39–107 (describing the historical rise of actuarial 
methods in criminal law administration). 
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follow the predictions of the algorithm.”62  While several sen-
tencing guidelines aggregated historical data on past sentenc-
ing practices, RAIs rely on more historical data that does not 
necessarily relate to sentencing,63 blameworthiness,64 or even 
criminal administration.65  Further, the tools are increasingly 
complex, meaning now or in the near future, no one, not even 
the tool designer, may understand why a defendant is classi-
fied in a particular risk category.66  Finally, many of the popu-
lar RAIs used in the states are proprietary in nature.67 
An expansive literature now considers actuarial risk as-
sessments in criminal administration, with a particular focus 
on its implications in the post-conviction sentencing context. 
Yet, none engage with the tools in this way.  Rather, scholar-
ship orients around three different frames when discussing the 
institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at sentenc-
ing.  First, many engage with the “risk” aspect of the tools. 
62 See CHRISTIN et al., supra note 2, at 6–7. 
63 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 104.  C.f. Anna Roberts, Arrests as 
Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 989, 1007–08 (2019) (critiquing actuarial risk assess-
ments that rely on arrests as predictive factors and a prediction outcome under-
mine the significance of the stage that is supposed to lie between arrest and 
adjudication—including judicial dismissals in furtherance of justice); Anna Rob-
erts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2017) (explaining the signifi-
cance of judicial dismissals “in furtherance of justice”). 
64 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal 
Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 489, 501–05 (2016) (explaining the ten-
sions between actuarial risk tools’ design for sentencing and the civil context on 
the basis of blameworthiness); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assess-
ment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 
391, 427–28 (2006) (arguing that actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing 
should include only predictive risk factors that pertain to blameworthiness). 
65 For example, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission considered includ-
ing information like county of origin in its actuarial risk assessment at sentenc-
ing. See PA COMM’N ON SENT’G, SPECIAL REPORT: IMPACT OF REMOVING AGE, GENDER, 
AND COUNTRY FROM THE RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE 1 (2015) (examining the impact of 
removing age, gender, and county of origin from an actuarial risk assessment and 
concluding that each demographic factor should be included to preserve predic-
tive accuracy).  The commission did not adopt this predictive factor in its tool due 
to public backlash. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 113. 
66 Current actuarial risk assessments use predetermined rules to predict 
predefined outcomes, but there is some interest in the application of machine 
learning tools to criminal administration, and sentencing specifically. See, e.g., 
Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sen-
tencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G  REP. 222 (2015) (exploring the possibility to 
improve accuracy in risk predictions). 
67 See Constructing, supra note 56, at 69–71 (noting that some tools used at 
sentencing are developed by sentencing commissions while others are created by 
publicly funded organizations); see also Andrea Nishi, Note, Privatizing Sentenc-
ing: A Delegation Framework for Recidivism Risk Assessment, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
1671, 1688–90 (2019) (highlighting the various obscured, subjective decisions of 
private developers and proposing alternative ways for courts to provide oversight 
to their development). 
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Thus, scholarship considers RAIs as part of a larger shift from 
a backward-looking, retribution-oriented era of reform toward 
a forward-looking, consequentialist-oriented era.68  Second, 
many engage with the “actuarial” aspect of the tools.  Thus, 
much scholarship adopts an almost compulsive focus on “new” 
issues relating to technical design or the nature of prediction in 
criminal administration.69  Finally, many engage with actuarial 
risk assessments as system-level tools to bring transparency 
and accountability to the judicial decision making process. 
Thus, scholarship considers how to implement and design ac-
tuarial risk assessments in criminal administration to best 
control sentencing outcomes.70 
While each of these frames is important, they are together 
and alone insufficient to conceptualize the significance of actu-
arial risk assessments’ institutionalization in the felony sen-
tencing process.  Each offers insight to challenges that the 
tools present in this current moment.  Yet, by situating actua-
rial risk assessments in isolation, as a new solution in this 
current moment or an old reform with a new twist, each frame 
invites scholars to selectively draw upon different continuities 
with the past that obscure a larger view of the present.  For 
example, thinking about the tools as a return to consequential-
ist reforms obscures the ways that this new kind of consequen-
68 See, e.g., Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4, at 592 (“if, as this article is 
assuming, risk is a legitimate sentencing factor . . . the premise that punishment 
is only about what people have done no longer applies. . . . Risk assessments are 
orthogonal to culpability assessments, both conceptually (the first is forward-
looking, the second is backward-looking), and practically (for instance, a single 
prior robbery conviction might call for more enhancement on desert grounds than 
on risk grounds).”); see also Monahan & Skeem, supra note 64, at 508 (summariz-
ing the issues relating to actuarial risk assessments at sentencing as a matter of 
utilitarian versus blameworthiness concerns). 
69 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 3, at 268 (framing discussion around artifi-
cial intelligence and algorithmic tools); see also Huq, Human Decision, supra note 
20, at 618 (framing the rise of actuarial risk assessments in the larger technologi-
cal milieu of the moment).  This literature in particular tends to explore the use of 
technical risk assessments in criminal administration more broadly, rather than 
limiting the scope to post-conviction sentencing.  For exemplary scholarship 
thinking about pretrial bail determinations and the design of actuarial risk as-
sessments, see Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 
687 (2018) (critiquing the definition of risk for actuarial tools used in the pretrial 
bail context). 
70 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & John Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. 
REV. 439, 476–83 (2020) (considering ways to convey risk information to improve 
judicial use of the information and identifying several ways to shape sentence 
outcomes through institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments in the pretrial 
and post-conviction sentencing context); Reitz, supra note 6, at 70–71 (describing 
the Virginia sentencing guidelines as a model of efforts to domesticate risk assess-
ments and urging a “ratchet down approach” to their use at sentencing). 
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tialism is completely different from the old form we abandoned 
in the 1970s.  That transformation pertains to the kinds of 
sentences we expect judges to produce;71 it also pertains to the 
kind of knowledge we expect judges to prioritize at sentenc-
ing.72  Similarly, a focus on technological change takes for 
granted the social changes that accompany it,73 including to 
the way we expect judges to think at sentencing.  Finally, 
thinking about actuarial risk assessments through a focus on 
transparency, accountability, and bureaucratic structure can 
erase the historically distinctive position of the judge at sen-
tencing when situated within the larger sphere of criminal 
administration.74 
In short, the existing frameworks fail to fully capture social 
and historical transformations in the nature of sentencing.  Yet 
seeing the bigger picture is critically important to understand-
ing and critiquing the present.  Thinking about the tools as part 
of the trend toward population-based sentencing allows us to 
engage with these continuities and discontinuities more fully. 
It creates space to acknowledge that efforts to formalize sen-
tencing change the nature of sentencing, and actuarial risk 
assessments intensify that transformation.  It also creates 
space to recognize that while the sentencing process remains 
the same, our expectations of judges are quite transformed. 
Actuarial risk assessments intensify that transformation as 
well. 
The population-based sentencing frame is particularly im-
portant as the debates about actuarial risk assessments shift 
toward the courts.  Actuarial risk assessments raise a series of 
concerns at sentencing that defendants are challenging in state 
71 Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 194 
(2013) (describing the shortcomings in embracing a new kind of rehabilitation 
grounded in economic-style rationales like cost saving and effectiveness to reduce 
mass incarceration); see also GARLAND, supra note 9, at 176 (describing the redefi-
nition of rehabilitation). 
72 AAS, supra note 7, at 67 (suggesting that, despite the claim that sentencing 
reforms lack coherent theory, “[c]oherence lies in the fact that the ideas and 
concepts which are, or can be, formatted tend to be given priority.”). 
73 Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8 (warning that the 
advance of technical reforms at sentencing distort social conceptions related to 
punishment and mass incarceration); see generally HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 
188–92 (warning that the advance of the actuarial distorts conceptions of 
punishment). 
74 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 81–82 (noting the unique role of 
the judge in exercising “genuine judgment” at sentencing, which the federal sen-
tencing guidelines threaten to undermine); AAS, supra note 7, at 35 (“Judges see 
their job [at sentencing] as . . . creating a balance between the formal and substan-
tive vision of justice—between the ‘tariff’ and the individual case.” (emphases in 
original)). 
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courts.  Though the concerns are quite distinct from the issues 
raised in relation to earlier era population-based sentencing 
tools, we might expect that the courts’ response to the dilem-
mas they present may share important continuities that are 
obscured by less holistic frames.75  Parts II and III take up that 
task of illuminating those continuities. 
II 
TECHNIQUE #1: EXPANDING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AT 
SENTENCING 
This Part argues that courts respond to the push toward 
population-based sentencing by expanding individual procedu-
ral rights into the sentencing process where they once did not 
apply.  While the U.S. Supreme Court expanded some rights to 
sentencing in response to the sentencing guidelines, state 
courts have not done so in the context of actuarial risk assess-
ments because the tools do not prevent judges from passing 
moral judgment on individual defendants. 
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Jurisprudence 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission developed the federal 
sentencing guidelines at the behest of congressional mandates. 
It produced a biaxial grid with 258 possible sentence ranges 
within which a judge could exercise its discretion.76  That grid 
provided a range within which a judge would ordinarily sen-
tence.  The court calculates that range based upon myriad ad-
ministrative rules and policies concerning abstract features of 
75 This Article focuses on what state courts are doing in response to actuarial 
risk assessments, which concerns engaging with procedural concerns that the 
tools raise at sentencing.  Much scholarship considers equality-based concerns 
with the design of actuarial risk assessments and its implications for equity. See 
supra notes 5 & 20.  This, too, should be analogized to the important case law and 
scholarship that developed around equality, the courts, and earlier population-
based sentencing tools.  For a seminal entry point to those topics, see David A. 
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1305 (1995) 
(compiling circuit court opinions on issues of race and the 100:1 ratio under the 
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties).  Alas, that topic could 
not be addressed in this Article, despite my many attempts to the contrary. 
Thanks to my dutiful mentors for making me see this.  Future work will consider 
the topic, and I invite others to join me in that important endeavor. 
76 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5.A (setting forth the sentencing grid in 
months of imprisonment). The commission designed the guidelines based on its 
analysis of 10,500 presentence reports. See U.S. SENT’G  COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPORT ON THE  INITIAL  SENTENCING  GUIDELINES AND  POLICY  STATEMENTS 21 (1987) 
[hereinafter COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].  For more on the design of sentencing 
guidelines, see Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 512–13 (reflect-
ing on the grid-like nature of most sentencing guidelines). 
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the crime and the offender (particularly his criminal history).77 
The tool was implemented in 1987.78  Though much revised 
since that time, it remains in use. 
This population-based sentencing tool transformed sen-
tencing practice in fundamental ways.  For example, the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission created quantifiable metrics that 
would convey crime severity at sentencing.  These metrics, like 
the choice to measure drug offenses by drug weight, were 
deeply controversial and out of step with the courts’ past prac-
tice.79  Further, due to the guidelines’ complexity and the way 
Congress implemented their use, a judge was recast as some-
thing more like “an accountant” who managed sentencing by 
finding facts that applied to the guidelines.80  This was 
achieved in three ways.  First, the Commission’s complex 
guideline structure appeared to preclude many reasons for a 
judge to “depart,” meaning sentence a defendant to a period of 
time that falls outside the mechanically calculated range pro-
scribed by the guidelines.81  Second, the federal appellate 
courts strictly enforced the Commission-proscribed sentencing 
guideline ranges against district court judges as a matter of 
choice.82  Third, Congress passed legislation that increasingly 
aimed to reduce judges’ ability to depart from the prescribed 
guideline ranges at sentencing.83  Through its implementation, 
77 See generally U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (2018). 
78 COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 11. 
79 E.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2.D1.1 (1987).  While the commission 
used an empirical approach to replicate past practices with some offenses, they 
did not in the context of drugs where they adopted a weight-based approach and 
incorporated Congress’s mandatory minimum penalty ratios. Id.; see also Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007) (“The Commission did not use 
this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-traffick-
ing offenses.”). 
80 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 82–85 (arguing that the tools eschewed 
a more traditional notion of judging whereby judges pass “moral judgment” on 
individual defendants for one where judges “process individuals according to a 
variety of purportedly objective criteria.”). 
81 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unaccept-
able Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1690-91 (1992) 
(“The new [federal] sentencing guidelines are more complex, inflexible, and severe 
than those devised by any other jurisdiction.”). 
82 Id. at 1683–84 (describing the federal sentencing guidelines as “mandatory 
guidelines” and emphasizing the “strict enforcement by courts of appeals hostile 
to departures” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Nancy Gertner, A Short His-
tory of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 703–04 (2010) (emphasizing that courts chose to 
enforce the federal sentencing guidelines as though they were mandatory). 
83 E.g., PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (amending 
the federal sentencing guidelines to constrain the courts’ ability to depart from 
guideline-recommended sentencing ranges). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018) ren-
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the federal sentencing guidelines became “advice” only in 
name.  In practice, they left judges with very little room to sen-
tence based on individual defendants.  Under restrictive guide-
lines, judges engaged in something that looked a lot more like 
processing, and a lot less like sentencing.84  In effect, judges 
were increasingly required to engage in population-based 
sentencing. 
In response, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the proce-
dural rights of individual defendants at sentencing. For exam-
ple, in Burns v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
defendants are entitled to notice before a district court sua 
sponte departs upward from an applicable sentence range 
under the mandatory guidelines.85  Such notice was not re-
quired prior to the federal sentencing guidelines, and it did not 
survive after the guidelines were rendered advisory.86  Yet, in 
Burns, the majority opinion recognized that lack of such notice 
in a sentencing process so changed by the federal sentencing 
guidelines would raise serious, constitutional due process 
concern.87 
More notably, the court expanded application of the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right to jurisdictions with “mandatory” 
sentencing structures in the 2000s.88  To understand the sig-
nificance of this decision requires some legal background.  In 
discretionary sentencing structures, the jury trial right tradi-
tionally did not apply.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, however, the 
dered the guidelines “mandatory.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2018) directed the appel-
late courts to review guideline departures under the searching de novo standard. 
These provisions made “Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had 
been.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
84 Gertner, supra note 82, at 705. 
85 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991) (“We hold that before 
a district court can depart upward on a ground not identified as a ground for 
upward departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission 
by the Government, [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32 requires that the 
district court give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a 
ruling.”). 
86 See id. at 133–34 (emphasizing procedural changes to the federal sentenc-
ing process created alongside the implementation of federal sentencing guide-
lines); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008) (“At the time of our 
decision in Burns, the Guidelines were mandatory; the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 prohibited district courts from disregarding “the mechanical dictates of the 
Guidelines” except in narrowly defined circumstances. . . . Now faced with advi-
sory Guidelines, neither the Government nor the defendant may place the same 
degree of reliance on the type of ‘expectancy’ that gave rise to a special need for 
notice in Burns.”). 
87 Burns, 501 U.S. at 138; see also Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 713–14 (emphasizing 
that Burns exists in the context of mandatory guidelines). 
88 For a definition of mandatory, see supra note 85. 
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U.S. Supreme Court applied the right to address concern about 
sentences that exceeded the legislatively proscribed, statutory 
range of sentence due to the court’s application of the state’s 
technical guidelines.89  For example, when Charles Apprendi 
was charged and pled guilty to weapons possession charges, 
the statute permitted a sentence of up to ten years in prison.90 
The trial judge found an additional fact—that Mr. Apprendi 
intended to commit a hate crime—and enhanced the sentence 
guideline range accordingly.91  The judge ultimately sentenced 
Mr. Apprendi to twelve years in prison—two years above the 
statutory maximum for the crime.92  The Apprendi Court 
struck down the sentencing enhancement beyond the statutory 
range of conviction as “a tail which wags the dog of the sub-
stantive offense.”93  The holding rejected, as unconstitutional, 
the ability of the court to find facts that would produce a sen-
tence that exceeded the statutory maximum for the charged 
offense. 
Four years later, the court expanded application of the jury 
trial right to within-statute guideline ranges in Washington 
State and the federal system.  In Blakely v. Washington, the 
U.S. Supreme Court applied the jury trial right to strike down 
Washington State’s “presumptive” sentencing guideline sys-
tem.94  Under that system, Washington law set a “standard” 
range of punishment for most crimes.95  A judge could sen-
tence above that range if an “aggravating factor” was present.96 
The Washington statute provided an “illustrative rather than 
exhaustive” list of “grounds for departure” from the guide-
lines.97  Though “judges were not limited to that list of factors 
nor were they obligated to increase a sentence based on a find-
ing of one of the aggravating factors,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
deemed the structure as mandatory.98  As the Court explained, 
a judge could not issue a sentence without finding some addi-
tional fact.99  Thus, it held that the sentencing range ensured 
by jury-found facts is effectively the “statutory maximum” in 
89 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469–70 (2000). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 471. 
93 Id. at 495 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). 
94 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); see also id. at 317 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 303. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 305. 
98 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 23, at 202; see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 
305. 
99 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. 
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that mandatory sentencing structure.  In Booker, a majority of 
the Court held that the federal guidelines, like the Washington 
State guidelines, violate due process and the Sixth Amend-
ment.100  In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the 
holding in Apprendi to mandatory guidelines operating within 
statutory sentencing ranges.101 
These cases suggest that, to the courts, procedural rights 
and population-based sentencing are intimately linked.  Where 
policymakers adopt a sentencing structure that directly con-
strains judicial sentencing power to fashion a sentence by 
passing moral judgment on the individual defendant, the 
courts expand individual procedural rights.  To that end, the 
cases vindicate an important, but constructed, binary at sen-
tencing: either judges retain sentencing discretion or defend-
ants get more procedural rights in the face of population-based 
sentencing.102  In some ways, this binary has existed since 
Williams, when the court rejected a confrontation clause chal-
lenge to out-of-court statements included in a presentence re-
port.103  Yet, the guidelines jurisprudence affirmed its salience 
in the context of population-based sentencing tools.104  In the 
100 Washington State’s guidelines operated in the same way as the federal 
sentencing guidelines.  The only meaningful distinction between the structures 
concerned who developed the guidelines—a commission in the federal system, 
and the legislature in Washington State.  Like the Washington State courts, a 
federal judge retained the power to depart from the sentencing guidelines.  United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
101 Id. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 
102 To the extent that judges play a more passive role in trials, one may think 
of this principle as suggesting that the expansion of procedural rights is likely to 
occur whenever sentencing takes on more characteristics of a trial. See STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 27, at 81 (distinguishing the reactive role of judges through-
out the adjudication process and the active role of judges in the post-conviction 
sentencing context).  However, my aim is not to focus as much on the formalities 
of the process for defendants, but the kind of thinking such a process permits 
judges to engage in as the question that triggers expansion of individual procedu-
ral rights. See infra subpart II.B. 
103 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
104 For insight to the curious persistence of Williams in the guidelines-based 
era of sentencing reform, see Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1051 (2005) (recognizing that it seems “paradoxical to im-
pose constitutional limits on sentencing that is governed by rules, while permit-
ting sentencing that is not governed by rules to escape all constitutional 
constraint,” and defending the distinction on the basis that adjudication focuses 
on rule of law while sentencing focuses on moral defensibility of our legal 
judgments. 
There are various liberty interests at the intersection of the due process and 
jury trial right in the sentencing context implicated by offense-oriented popula-
tion-based sentencing tools.  This includes the pursuit of accurate fact finding, 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 287–88 (Stevens J., dissenting in part) (arguing that in many 
instances, engrafting the jury trial right would require the Government “simply 
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wake of Booker, the Court has repeatedly affirmed this binary 
in its sentencing jurisprudence.105  Where the judge can sen-
tence individual defendants, more procedural protections are 
not required. 106  The critical question turns on what kind of 
sentencing structure a jurisdiction maintains.107 
[to] prove additional facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (upholding the reasonable-doubt standard 
as a due process right in part to reduce errors in factfinding); the allocation of 
sentencing power between the branches of government, see Blakely v. Washing-
ton, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004) (“[The jury trial right] is no mere procedural 
formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. 
Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and execu-
tive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”); see 
also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional 
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 63 (2003) (“The 
Constitution . . . places a judicial veto in the hands of the people because the 
danger of state abuse is especially high and the consequences are especially 
troubling [in criminal administration]. . . . Less commonly observed is the fact 
that the judiciary is comprised of both judges and juries and that this division 
also checks state abuse of power.” (emphasis omitted)); and empowering local 
juries to apply and contest applications of the law, see Alleyne v. United States, 
570 U.S. 99, 123 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (“I cannot accept the 
dissent’s characterization of the Sixth Amendment as simply seeking to prevent 
‘judicial overreaching’ when sentencing facts are at issue.  At the very least, the 
Amendment seeks to protect defendants against ‘the wishes and opinions of the 
government’ as well.  And, that being so, it seems to me highly anomalous to read 
Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing facts that permit a judge to 
impose a higher sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that 
require a judge to impose a higher sentence.” (citations omitted)); LAURA I. AP-
PLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (2015) 
(critiquing the elimination of “the local public” from the criminal justice process in 
the last thirty years and celebrating the jury trial right jurisprudence as vindica-
tion of that important public function). 
105 After Booker, the central concern is whether the guidelines operate enough 
like law to require vindicating a procedural due process right at sentencing.  For 
example, in Irizarry v. United States, the Court held that the advisory sentencing 
guidelines were not law-like enough for the due process right to notice.  553 U.S. 
708, 713–15 (2008).  In Peugh v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines 
were law-like enough for ex post facto right.  569 U.S. 530, 534–35 (2013).  In 
Beckles v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines were not law-like 
enough to implicate the void for vagueness doctrine.  137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
106 This is, in itself, a quixotic question because sentencing structures exist on 
a spectrum rather than a finite binary between “mandatory” and “advisory.” See 
Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 
157 (2005) (setting forth a ten-point spectrum of enforceability); Hessick & Hes-
sick, supra note 23, at 195 (arguing that mandatory and discretionary sentencing 
structures are better understood as falling along a spectrum and urging applica-
tion of procedural rights regardless of sentencing structure). 
107 A line of the post-Booker jurisprudence considers whether, and what, addi-
tional procedural protections survive in an advisory guidelines system.  The cen-
tral concern is whether the guidelines operate enough like law to require 
vindicating a procedural due process right at sentencing.  The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence is inconsistent in on that front.  For example, in Irizarry v. United 
States, the Court held that the advisory sentencing guidelines were not law-like 
enough for the due process right to notice.  553 U.S. 708, 713–15 (2008).  In 
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B. Actuarial Risk Assessments in the State Sentencing 
Jurisprudence 
To date, state courts have not expanded individual proce-
dural rights in jurisdictions where courts use particular actua-
rial risk assessments at sentencing.  This is likely because the 
tools have not been implemented in a way that fundamentally 
undermines the court’s traditional ability to pass moral judg-
ment on individual defendants at sentencing. 
Defendants enjoy minimal procedural rights at sentencing, 
yet actuarial risk assessments exist in some tension with those 
rights.  For example, actuarial risk assessments can under-
mine the defendant’s due process right not to be sentenced 
based on irrational or irrelevant sentencing factors.108  Predic-
tive risk factors exist in tension with state sentencing laws.  As 
an example, Indiana strictly regulates the consideration of ac-
quitted behavior, yet actuarial tools may use such information 
in assessing risk.109  Actuarial tools may also violate state laws 
requiring that “sentence decisions be neutral of a variety of 
status variables, including race, ethnicity, national origin, gen-
der, and religion” and, in some instances, social status.110 
While some argue that risk may influence the sentence, but 
these individual sentencing factors cannot, there is some ambi-
guity on whether predictive risk factors and sentencing factors 
should be considered as the same thing.111  Actuarial risk as-
Peugh v. United States, the Court held that the guidelines were law-like enough for 
ex post facto right.  569 U.S. 530, 534–35 (2013).  In Beckles v. United States, the 
Court held that the guidelines were not law-like enough to implicate the void for 
vagueness doctrine.  137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
108 See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 885 (1983).  Notably, the RAIs used in noncapital sentencing do not include 
race as a predictive risk factor. 
109 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 104. 
110 Hamilton, supra note 55, at 274 n.320 (citing statutes from Arkansas, 
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee prohibiting con-
sideration of race, gender, and economic status at sentencing).  For example, Ohio 
and Tennessee prohibit gender as an influencing factor at sentencing. See OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(c) (West 2020) (“A court that imposes a sentence upon 
an offender for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic back-
ground, gender, or religion of the offender.”); TENN. CODE  ANN. § 40-35-102(4) 
(2020) (“Sentencing should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender, 
creed, religion, national origin and social status of the individual. . . .”).  For an 
analogous argument in relation to federal statute should an actuarial risk assess-
ment be adopted in the federal sentencing process, see Dawinder S. Sidhu, 
Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 693–701 (2015) (raising the statutory 
limitation issue, but providing “another, independently-sufficient basis for 
prohibiting” these factors in risk assessments in the U.S. Constitution). 
111 See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (“It would be patently unconstitutional for a 
state to argue that the defendant is liable to be a future danger because of his 
race); Goel et al., supra note 3 (suggesting that “Buck appears to be a case about 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-FEB-21 10:52
R
376 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:353 
sessments can also undermine the defendant’s due process 
right to be sentenced based on accurate information.112  One 
way to interpret that right concerns the level of technical accu-
racy in the tools’ design, which varies.113  Another concerns the 
lack of transparency in the tools, particularly the proprietary 
tools whose algorithms are often unavailable for inspection.114 
RAI advocates tend to encourage courts to expand individ-
ual procedural rights to cope with these concerns at sentenc-
ing.  For example, Professor Brandon Garrett and Dr. John 
race, not about all immutable traits or risk more generally”); see generally Jessica 
M. Eaglin, Predictive Analytics’ Punishment Mismatch, 14 I/S 87, 98–99 (2017) 
(summarizing the emerging divide in scholarship on the predictive risk factors 
versus sentencing factors issue). 
112 In the capital context, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right to 
test the accuracy of information. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 
(1977) (emphasizing that “the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must 
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause” and rejecting the state’s effort 
to “permit[ ] a trial judge to impose the death sentence on the basis of confidential 
information which is not disclosed to the defendant or his counsel”).  In the 
noncapital context, the Court has recognized a similar principle. See Townsend v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948) (“[O]n this record we conclude that, while 
disadvantaged by lack of counsel, this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of 
assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such 
a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due 
process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.”). 
113 This issue turns on the question of how to measure accuracy, and whether 
any of that matters in comparison to clinical, meaning unstructured, judgments 
of risk made by human actors.  I have toed into this discourse before, and will not 
do so here. See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 89–94.  Suffice it to say, 
the existing jurisprudence around predictions and criminal sentencing is ex-
tremely permissive. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding the 
Texas death penalty law that directs juries to determine whether to impose the 
death penalty on a particular defendant in part based on predictions of a defen-
dant’s future behavior); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 904 (1983) (upholding 
the Texas statute by establishing a very low bar for constitutionality of predictions 
generally).  For a recent and accessible overview of the accuracy-related issues 
raised by actuarial risk assessments, see MELISSA  HAMILTON, RISK  ASSESSMENT 
TOOLS IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM—THEORY AND PRACTICE 24–58 (2020) (describ-
ing the science underlying algorithmic risk tools). 
114 For example, equivant, the commercial developer of the Northpointe COM-
PAS assessment, refuses to release the formula used to predict recidivism risk in 
the tool as a trade secret. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 761 (“Northpointe, Inc., the 
developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary instrument and a trade 
secret.”); Risk Scores: The Not-So-Secret Recipe, EQUIVANT (Aug. 14, 2020), https:// 
www.equivant.com/risk-scores-the-not-so-secret-recipe/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5ZW3-ZXBL], (noting that “raw score[s are] calculated based on the formulas in 
the software”).  For a critique of proprietary claims in criminal administration, see 
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1376 (2018) (warning of trade secret 
concerns with RAIs at sentencing). For a recent claim that such proprietary tools 
should violate an individual defendant’s due process rights at sentencing, see 
Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279–82 (2020) (discussing why “the Due Process 
Clause and other policy justifications do require courts to give expanded opportu-
nities for defendants to challenge the validity of a risk assessment” at sentencing). 
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Monahan suggest “the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses demand additional assurances of consistency and reli-
ability beyond the minimal requirement that some individual 
decision-maker theoretically consider the relevant criteria and 
state some reason for a decision [at sentencing].”115  As one 
notable example, enthusiasm is growing for courts to recognize 
some of the same procedural rights that have been urged in the 
face of automated government decision making systems from 
the civil, mostly welfare context.  Professors Danielle Citron 
and Frank Pasquale say courts should recognize enhanced due 
process rights to “inspect, correct, or dispute” automated gov-
ernment decision making tools.116  Recently, data governance 
policymakers have urged courts to adopt this meaning of the 
right to be sentenced based on accurate information at sen-
tencing.117  In a recent article on this point, several scholars 
called for this kind of due process right at sentencing by analo-
gizing between the right to inspect a presentence report and the 
right to inspect an actuarial risk assessment.118  If one can 
inspect a presentence report, they suggest, one should be able 
to inspect the RAI score embedded within the presentence re-
port to make sure it is accurate.119  Thus, these scholars and 
advocates seek to expand procedural rights at sentencing by 
115 Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 484.  Though the authors focus their 
critique on the trend in the bail context, they discuss the expansion of actuarial 
risk assessments in both the pretrial and postconviction context, and so appear to 
apply the concern equally to both contexts. 
116 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Pro-
cess for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (2014) (encouraging 
enhanced due process standards for individuals subject to adjudications with 
automated predictions). 
117 See Danielle Citron, (Un)fairness of Risk Scores in Criminal Sentencing, 
FORBES (July 13, 2016, 3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/ 
2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#309a91754ad2 
[https://perma.cc/278X-N72U] (commending the Loomis court for addressing 
risk assessments, but critiquing its approach based on automation bias); see also 
DANIELLE L. KEHL, PRISCILLA  GUO & SAMUEL  KESSLER, ALGORITHMS IN THE  CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE  SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE  USE OF  RISK  ASSESSMENTS AT  SENTENCING 22–23 
(2017), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33746041 [https:// 
perma.cc/9D7P-HTLD] (noting that “there is a plausible distinction between being 
able to review and rebut the individual pieces of information that are fed into the 
algorithm and being able to actual[ly] review how the score itself was calculated,” 
but not necessarily urging a due process right to review). 
118 Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 280–81. 
119 See id. at 281 (“Because information considered by predictive algorithmic 
tools is similar, if not identical, to that in federal sentencing reports, state and 
federal courts should fashion procedural rules similar to the federal rules to allow 
defendants to challenge the accuracy of algorithmic risk assessments.”); see also 
id. at 282–83 (applying this argument to the Loomis decision). 
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changing the meaning of an existing right to accommodate the 
new realities of government decision making. 
The courts, for the most part, have rejected these procedu-
ral challenges when defendants appeal from sentences where 
courts considered an RAI in the sentencing process.120  For 
example, in State v. Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered due process challenges to Eric Loomis’s sentence.121 
The sentencing court considered risk scores included in the 
presentence report provided to the court.  The scores were the 
product of a proprietary tool, the Correctional Offender Man-
agement Profile for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), adopted 
by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for statewide 
use.122  Mr. Loomis asserted that the tool produced inaccurate 
information that he could not assess without information 
about how the factors were weighed.123  The court, drawing on 
the presentence report analogy, rejected the claim.124  It sug-
gested that defendants receive information about the risk score 
in advance of the sentencing hearing, and so no additional 
information is required to satisfy constitutional due process 
concerns.125 
Juxtaposing this case against recent scholarly critiques 
illuminates the value of the population-based sentencing 
frame.  If what courts are supposed to do at sentencing has 
fundamentally mutated to the point where judges engage in 
population-based sentencing, as unfortunately the trend has 
been in the welfare context, then perhaps procedures should 
change.126  Yet, if what judges still do at sentencing is pass 
120 But see, e.g., State v. Guise, 919 N.W.2d 635, *4 (Iowa App. Ct. 2018) 
(overturning a sentence because the sentencing judge relied on an actuarial risk 
assessment that lacked transparency) (sentence reinstated in State v. Guise, 921 
N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa 2018)). 
121 Eric Loomis pled guilty to fleeing a police officer and operating a car with-
out the owner’s consent.  881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016).  The trial court im-
posed the maximum sentence available under the statute. Id. at 756. 
122 See ROGER K. WARREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH 
LEADERSHIP IN  SENTENCING AND  CORRECTIONS  REFORMS 1, 6 (2013), https:// 
www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/26217/state-judicial-branch-lead-
ership-brief-csi.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMS4-Z883].  The Department of Correc-
tions is responsible for preparing the presentence reports in Wisconsin. WIS. 
STAT. § 972.15 (2020). 
123 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d. at 757. 
124 Id. at 761. 
125 Id. (suggesting that the presentence report analogy is imperfect). 
126 But see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 1695, 1722 (2019) (book review) (critiquing the trend in focus on technologi-
cal fixes that aim to eliminate biases from algorithms and emphasizing that 
“[s]ome government decisions simply should not be automated at all because 
automation itself makes adjudication undemocratic.”). 
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moral judgment on individual defendants, then the procedures 
do not need to change.  The traditional sentencing process ex-
pects individual judges to make informed decisions about indi-
vidual defendants at sentencing using all the information 
available to them.  Within the framework of population-based 
sentencing, it becomes clear that we are asking the wrong 
question of the courts.  The matter is not whether judges can 
consider a tool that lacks transparency or includes controver-
sial, but not prohibited, predictive factors at sentencing.127 
Rather, the matter is whether the conditions around sentenc-
ing have changed so much that courts must engage in popula-
tion-based sentencing and procedural rights, once 
unnecessary at sentencing, are now required. 
While Congress, the U.S. Commission, and the federal ap-
pellate courts made it very clear that the sociological conditions 
of sentencing had changed in the context of the federal guide-
lines, it is not so clear now in the context of actuarial risk 
assessments at sentencing.  What is clear from the state courts’ 
sentencing jurisprudence, however, is that this is the exact 
question that the courts want to know.  Two examples make 
the point. 
First, Virginia incorporates RAIs into the sentencing pro-
cess through its advisory guidelines.128  These guidelines are, 
and have always been, “flexible guideposts” to which judges 
voluntarily adhere at sentencing.129  Judges can depart from 
127 Brenner et al., supra note 3, at 279 (“The question is whether this ‘black 
box’ methodology violates the due process rights of criminal defendants by deny-
ing them the opportunity to challenge their output risk scores, or the means by 
which those scores were calculated.”). Whether judges can do this is distinct from 
the normative question of whether they should. See Criminal Law—Sentencing 
Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use of Algorithmic 
Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (2017) (“The Loomis opinion, then, failed to answer 
why, given the risks, courts should still use such assessments.”). 
128 There, the Virginia Sentencing Commission developed an actuarial risk 
assessment to identify “25 percent of the lowest risk, incarceration-bound, drug 
and property offenders for placement in alternative (non-prison) sanctions” in the 
state.  Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with 
Integrated Offender Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2004).  The 
sentencing commission incorporated its Nonviolent Risk Assessment instrument 
into the sentencing guidelines in 2002.  Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 461 
(noting that the tool includes the following risk factors: age, gender, prior adult 
felony convictions, prior adult incarcerations, prior juvenile adjudications, and 
prior arrest in the last twelve months).  Soon thereafter, it introduced two other 
actuarial risk assessments for sex offenders into the state’s sentencing guidelines. 
Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 128, at 166–67. 
129 See Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 752, 755 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
Richard Kern, Sentence Reform in Virginia, 8 FED. SENT’G  REP. 84, 84 (1995) 
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the guideline range for any reason at all.  The actuarial risk 
assessments can shape the recommendations within the 
guidelines, but the guidelines themselves have never been en-
forceable through appellate review.130  A judge need not explain 
why she did or did not adhere to the recommendations.131 
Consistent with that structural reality, the Virginia state courts 
virtually eliminated constitutional challenges to the use of ac-
tuarial risk assessments at sentencing through two appellate 
cases decided in 2004.  The first, Brooks v. Commonwealth,132 
is an unpublished decision.  There, defendant Christopher 
Brooks raised due process and equal protection challenges to 
the trial court’s consideration of the actuarial risk information 
as part of the sentencing guidelines recommendation.133  The 
appellate court dismissed these challenges on the basis that 
the Virginia sentencing guidelines are nonbinding.  So long as 
the sentence falls within the statutory limits set by the legisla-
ture, appellate courts will not review it.134  A second case, Lut-
trell v. Commonwealth,135 results in a similar published 
holding.  There, the Virginia Court of Appeals considered defen-
dant Brian Luttrell’s argument that the state’s Sex Offender 
Risk Assessment Instrument was “unreliable in predicting re-
cidivism.”136  The appellate court dismissed this challenge, ex-
plaining that failure to correctly apply the guidelines is 
unreviewable on appeal.137  Thus, both Luttrell and Brooks 
have precluded constitutional challenge to RAIs at sentencing 
in Virginia courts. 
More recent state cases echo this approach to procedural 
challenges at sentencing.  As an example, consider Michigan. 
That state maintains advisory sentence guidelines based on the 
offense and the offender’s criminal history.138  Though the 
(noting that the guidelines were “voluntary,” meaning “judges could depart with-
out specifying a rationale and there was no appellate review”). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 No. 2540–02–3, 2004 WL 136090 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004). 
133 Id. at *1. 
134 Id. 
135 592 S.E.2d 752 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
136 Id. at 755.  The heart of Mr. Luttrell’s challenge related to whether the court 
could apply old or new guidelines since the sentencing commission increased the 
threshold for increases in the guideline range. 
137 Id. 
138 See MICHIGAN  JUDICIAL  INSTITUTE, SENTENCING  GUIDELINES  MANUAL 5 (2020), 
available at https://mjieducation.mi.gov/documents/sgm-files/94-sgm/file 
[https://perma.cc/KVR5-RSUC] (even though the state sentencing guidelines are 
now advisory rather than binding, “sentencing courts are still required to deter-
mine the applicable guideline range and take it into account when imposing a 
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guidelines are no longer binding, sentencing courts must deter-
mine the applicable guideline range and take it into account 
when imposing a sentence.139  Since 2014, Michigan Depart-
ment of Corrections officials have incorporated the COMPAS 
Risk/Needs Assessment into the presentence report provided 
to state judges.140  In 2019, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
issued an unpublished opinion concerning four consolidated 
cases where the sentencing judges considered presentence re-
ports that included the proprietary actuarial risk assessment 
scores.141  The defendants asserted that lower courts violated 
their due process rights by considering the COMPAS tool that 
analyzes general population data, uses input factors that dis-
criminatorily impact race and gender, and lacks trans-
parency.142  In rejecting the challenges and affirming the 
sentences, the court emphasized upfront: “A sentencing court 
is not bound by the recommendations included in a 
[presentence report], including the recommended range for a 
minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines.”143  Fur-
ther, it rejected the defendants’ claim that “inclusion of COM-
PAS information unfairly influences or replaces a sentencing 
court’s individual sentencing discretion” by analogizing be-
tween the tools’ recommendation and a probation officer’s 
report.144 
These holdings illustrate appellate courts looking to sen-
tencing structure to understand if RAIs actually reduce the 
court’s ability to pass moral judgment on individual defendants 
at sentencing.  Without indications of such, the courts are not 
willing to overturn the trial court’s sentence determination. 
They are not willing to expand procedural rights at sentencing 
either.  This illuminates a key point about population-based 
sentencing.  As with the guidelines, the presence of an actua-
rial risk assessment alone is not enough to convince the courts 
sentence.”); People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Mich. 2015) (rendering the 
previously-mandatory state sentencing guidelines advisory by applying the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence). 
139 MICHIGAN JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, supra note 138, at 5. 
140 See Michigan Department of Corrections, Administration and Use of COM-
PAS in the Presentence Investigation Report 22 (2017), available at https:// 
www.michbar.org/file/news/releases/archives17/COMPAS-at-PSI-Manual-2-
27-17-Combined.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LR4-NLFF]. 
141 People v. Younglove, No. 341901, 2019 WL 846117, at *1 (Mich. App. Feb. 
21, 2019).  Defendants challenged the sentences on the basis that COMPAS ana-
lyzes general population data, uses input factors that discriminatorily impact race 
and gender, and lacks transparency. Id. 
142 Id. at *2. 
143 Younglove, 2019 WL 846117, at *3. 
144 Id. 
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that the nature of sentencing has fundamentally changed. 
Courts care about that bigger picture.  At sentencing, the socio-
logical context around the nature of judging is critically impor-
tant to determining whether and how procedural rights may 
expand. 
III 
TECHNIQUE #2: CREATING PROCEDURAL RULES AT 
SENTENCING 
This Part argues that courts respond to the push toward 
population-based sentencing by creating procedural rules that 
preserve a judge’s ability to pass moral judgment on an individ-
ual defendant.  The U.S. Supreme Court created light, and then 
more substantive, procedural rules to preserve the ability for 
federal judges to pass moral judgment on individual defend-
ants under the federal sentencing guidelines.  Some state 
courts are creating light procedural rules to preserve judicial 
power to pass moral judgment in the face of actuarial risk 
assessments’ expansion at sentencing.  Others would preserve 
that power without creating new rules. 
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Jurisprudence 
The U.S. Supreme Court created light procedural rules 
and, as the guidelines were enforced more strictly against dis-
trict court judges, heftier rules.145  These rules created a space 
for judges to continue passing moral judgment on individual 
defendants at sentencing. 
For an example of a lighter procedural rule, consider Koon 
v. United States.146  There, the Supreme Court established a 
procedural rule that appellate courts review a sentencing 
judge’s decision to depart from guideline recommended sen-
tence ranges under a deferential, abuse of discretion stan-
145 The creation of procedural rules in constitutional criminal procedure reso-
nates of a substantive due process analysis, but it is distinct.  Substantive due 
process analysis balances the liberty-enhancing potential of a right against the 
government interest in an efficient sentencing process. See, e.g., Burns v. United 
States, 501 U.S. 129, 148–56 (Souter, J., dissenting) (applying the Mathews v. 
Eldridge test to due process right to notice concern under the mandatory guide-
lines).  Courts tend to adopt a “balancing-of-interests” approach when creating 
criminal procedure rules, which occurs “at a higher level” compared to the balanc-
ing conducted at the level of individual cases.  Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 737 (2000). 
For a rich description of the “balancing-of-interests” approach to constitutional 
criminal procedure, see id. at 794–98. 
146 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
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dard.147  In reaching this holding, the court emphasized how 
this population-based sentencing tool changed the nature of 
sentencing.  As Justice Paul Stevens explained for the Court, 
“the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree 
of detachment lacking in our earlier system [of sentencing].”148 
At the same time, judging exists in some tension with those 
aims.  As the Court explained: “It has been uniform and con-
stant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to 
consider every convicted person as an individual and every 
case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes 
mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to 
ensue.”149  The procedural rule ameliorates that tension.150  In 
other words, it affirmed the ability for judges to pass moral 
judgment on individual defendants in the face of population-
based sentencing. 
The more substantive procedural rule comes from Booker, 
decided two years after Congress passed legislation to make the 
federal guidelines “more mandatory.”151  Though a majority of 
the Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines violated 
an individual’s due process and jury trial right,152 the Court 
went further by creating a procedural fix.  The Booker remedial 
decision identified two ways to cure the due process defect that 
the sentencing guidelines created.153  One route, offered by the 
remedial minority of the Court, was to apply the jury trial right 
to the federal sentencing guidelines.  That route, as explained 
by Justice Stevens, would require a jury to find the facts that 
trigger a sentence enhancement above the effective sentence 
range proscribed by facts found beyond a reasonable doubt by 
jurors at trial.154  For example, defendant Freddie Booker was 
convicted of possession to distribute at least fifty grams of 
crack cocaine, leading to conviction under a statute that car-
ries a minimum sentence of ten years in prison and a maxi-
147 Id. at 91 (“The appellate court should not review the departure decision de 
novo, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its 
discretion.”). 
148 Id. at 113. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. (“We do not understand it to have been the congressional purpose to 
withdraw all sentencing discretion from the United States district judge. Discre-
tion is reserved within the Sentencing Guidelines, and reflected by the standard of 
appellate review that we adopt.”). 
151 See supra note 83. 
152 See supra notes 100–01. 
153 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (summarizing the dual approaches to remedy-
ing the jury trial right problem in federal sentencing guidelines). 
154 Id.at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 32 16-FEB-21 10:52
384 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:353 
mum of life imprisonment.155 The jury, at trial, heard evidence 
that the defendant possessed 92.5 grams of crack cocaine.156 
Based on Booker’s criminal history and the amount of drugs 
found by the jury, the sentencing guidelines prescribed the 
judge to sentence Mr. Booker to a range between 210 and 262 
months in prison.157  At the sentencing hearing, however, the 
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. 
Booker actually possessed 658.5 grams of crack cocaine; this 
finding led to a guideline-prescribed sentence range between 
360 months to life.158  The guideline-prescribed minimum, 
while within the statutory range set out by the legislature, in-
creased the defendant’s expected sentence range by more than 
100 months.159  Justice Stevens’s solution to the jury trial right 
problem would require the jury to make the finding of fact 
about the amount of drugs possessed by the defendant beyond 
a reasonable doubt.160  This approach would collapse the jury 
trial right into a population-based sentencing regime. 
The other route, adopted by the remedial majority of the 
Court, created the space for judges to continue passing moral 
judgment on individual defendants at sentencing.  All of the 
Justices agreed that an advisory sentencing guideline struc-
ture, where judges retained discretion to sentence as they saw 
fit with reference to guidelines but independent from their dik-
tats, could evade Sixth Amendment scrutiny.  Justice Stevens 
conceded as much in his defect majority opinion.  He 
explained: 
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely 
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, 
the selection of particular sentences in response to differing 
sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amend-
ment.  We have never doubted the authority of a judge to 
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range.  Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitu-
tional issues presented by [this case] would have been 
avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [federal 
Sentencing Reform Act] the provisions that make the Guide-
lines binding on district judges . . . .  For when a trial judge 
155 Id. at 227. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 The trial judge found that Mr. Booker possessed 566 grams of crack in 
addition to the 92.5 grams found by the jury at trial. Id. at 235, 257. 
159 Id. at 235. 
160 Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also Cunningham v. Califor-
nia, 549 U.S. 270, 286 (2007) (summarizing the options before the Supreme Court 
when faced with the jury trial right problem in Booker). 
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exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a 
defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determi-
nation of the facts that the judge deems relevant.161 
In this regime, judges retained broad discretion free of techni-
cal guidelines. 
The Booker remedial majority took the latter option.162  In 
an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the U.S. Su-
preme Court created a new procedural rule at sentencing: the 
guidelines were “effectively advisory.”163  It excised two statu-
tory provisions that made the guidelines system mandatory in 
nature.  The first provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), prevented a 
district court judge from departing from the mechanical dic-
tates of the guidelines unless it made findings of an aggravating 
or mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission.164  The second provision, 
section 3742(e), enhanced the appellate courts’ enforcement of 
sentences outside the guidelines.165  Because the guidelines 
recommended, but no longer required, a judge to sentence a 
defendant above the effective statutory range set by guidelines 
and based on the finding of particular facts, it evaded the con-
stitutional concern.166 
This decision created the space for individual judges to 
continue the traditional process of passing moral judgment on 
individual defendants at sentencing.  The ensuing federal sen-
tencing jurisprudence made this point abundantly clear. For 
example, consider Kimbrough v United States.167 There, the 
Court upheld a district court judge’s decision not to sentence a 
defendant convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine within the 
proscribed guideline range.168  Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, defendant Derrick Kimbrough should have received 
a sentence between 19 to 22.5 years in prison.169  The district 
court decided to “override” the guideline recommendation and 
161 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (citations omitted). 
162 This determination rested largely on the Court’s recognition that sentenc-
ing guidelines achieved the government’s interest in order—through the pursuit of 
an efficient, uniform, and systemically managed sentencing structure. Id. at 
250–58 (emphasizing the need for uniformity in sentencing, for managing 
prosecutorial discretion, and for basing punishment on the “real conduct that 
underlies the crime of conviction” (emphasis omitted)). 
163 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
164 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018). 
165 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 
166 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
167 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
168 Id. at 112. 
169 Id. at 92. 
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sentence Mr. Kimbrough to the fifteen-year mandatory mini-
mum penalty required in the case.170  The district court based 
its decision in part on a policy disagreement with the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s decision to incorporate the 
mandatory minimum drug penalty structure into the otherwise 
empirically-informed guidelines.171  In affirming the district 
court’s sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the socio-
logical reasons why these drug guidelines are worthy of disa-
greement as a policy matter.  It emphasized the racial 
disparities that the drug guidelines are perceived to create,172 
the contested origin of the mandatory minimum penalty,173 
and the ongoing policy debate about the legitimacy of these 
guidelines, specifically.174  These critiques of the guidelines 
bolstered the court’s affirmation of the district court’s “institu-
tional strength” in judging an individual defendant at 
sentencing.175 
As another example, the Court that same day affirmed a 
sentence outside the proscribed guideline range for defendant 
Brian Gall.176  Mr. Gall voluntarily exited a drug distribution 
conspiracy ring three years before federal prosecutors charged 
him with drug trafficking in methamphetamine.177  At sentenc-
ing, the Iowa district court refused to sentence Mr. Gall to time 
in prison, contrary to the guideline recommendation.178  It sug-
gested that a sentence to probation rather than prison would 
do more to advance Mr. Gall’s “self-rehabilitat[ion].”179  In Gall 
v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s sentence, holding that it was not outside the realm of a 
reasonable sentence even if it contradicted the guideline calcu-
170 Id. at 93. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 98 (highlighting the U.S. Sentencing commission’s conclusion 
that “the crack/powder sentencing differential fosters disrespect for and lack of 
confidence in the criminal justice system because of a widely-held perception that 
it promotes unwarranted disparity based on race” and noting the racial disparities 
in defendants convicted of federal crack cocaine offenses). 
173 See id. at 94–97 (describing the distinction between crack and power co-
caine, the crack/powder disparity in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the 
Commission’s decision to collapse the weight-driven scheme into the guideline 
structure). 
174 See id. at 97–100 (describing the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s effort to 
reform the crack/powder sentencing guidelines). 
175 Id. at 109. 
176 Mr. Gall was sentenced to 36 months of probation, compared to the sen-
tence range of 30-37 months imprisonment prescribed by the federal sentencing 
guidelines. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 43 (2007). 
177 Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
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lation.180  In Gall, like in Kimbrough, the court emphasized so-
ciological realities about punishment in society.  In both cases, 
these critiques were launched to affirm Booker’s rule that the 
federal sentencing guidelines are advisory.181 
These cases affirmed the power of judges to pass moral 
judgment on individual defendants in social context, rather 
than sentencing in the abstract.  The cases vindicated a partic-
ular kind of penal knowledge grounded in understanding the 
individual and society.  While legislatures and the federal sen-
tencing commission pushed courts toward population-based 
sentencing, the court defended lower courts’ ability to think 
about “every convicted person as an individual and every case 
as a unique study in human failing.”182  It achieved this 
through creation of procedural rules. 
B. Actuarial Risk Assessments in the State Sentencing 
Jurisprudence 
In response to procedural challenges to sentences where 
courts considered actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, 
some state courts are creating light procedural rules to pre-
serve the space for judges to continue passing moral judgment 
on individual defendants at sentencing.  Other states courts 
would preserve that space without creating new procedural 
rules. 
For an example of a state court creating procedural rules to 
preserve the space for judges to pass moral judgment on indi-
vidual defendants rather than engage in population-based sen-
tencing, consider State v. Loomis.  Mr. Loomis challenged his 
sentence on three grounds related to the sentencing court’s 
reference to a proprietary RAI scores that characterized the 
defendant as high risk.183  First, Mr. Loomis asserted that the 
tool produced inaccurate information that he could not assess 
180 Id. at 59–60. 
181 Judges must still reference the federal sentencing guidelines as a starting 
point in their sentencing process, even if a judge can issue a sentence that dis-
agrees with the guideline range suggested by the Sentencing Commission on 
policy grounds. E.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
182 Koon, 518 U.S. at 113; see also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (emphasizing 
the “institutional strengths” of the sentencing judge); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51–52 
(emphasizing the “institutional advantage” of district courts at sentencing). 
183 See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 755 (noting that the COMPAS risk scores con-
sidered by the court at sentencing characterized Mr. Loomis as “high risk of 
violence, high risk of recidivism, [and] high pre-trial risk”). 
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without information about how the factors were weighed.184 
Second, Loomis asserted that the tool violated his due process 
right to an individualized sentence.185  Finally, Mr. Loomis ar-
gued that the court violated his due process rights by consider-
ing COMPAS-produced information because the tool relies on 
gender as a factor to determine risk level.186 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected each of these 
claims,187 but created procedural rules in the state to preserve 
the space for judges not to engage in population-based sen-
tencing.  Building upon a notable ruling on RAIs at sentencing 
from Indiana in 2010,188 Loomis prohibits lower courts from 
using an RAI to determine the severity of the sentence.189  It 
adds another dimension through an additional constraint: 
judges cannot use RAIs as “the determinative factor in deciding 
whether an offender can be supervised safely and effectively in 
the community.”190 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court goes further by issuing sev-
eral warnings to sentencing judges that must attach to every 
presentence report that includes a COMPAS risk assessment in 
the state.191  These warnings concern: (1) the tool’s proprietary 
nature; (2) the tool’s reliance on group data versus individual-
ized information; (3) the concern that tools disproportionately 
classify minority defendants as higher risk; (4) the variation in 
validation studies; and (5) the fact that COMPAS was developed 
to assist the Department of Corrections in the post-sentencing 
context.192  The warnings are a corollary to the procedural 
rules declared by the court.193  In addition, the court called on 
the judiciary to constantly monitor the tools, leaving space for 
potentially different notifications attached to different types of 
risk tools used now or developed in the future.194 
These procedural rules aim to preserve the space for judges 
to sentence individual defendants in social context rather than 
184 Id. at 757.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court previously stated outright that 
defendants have a “constitutionally protected due process right to be sentenced 
upon accurate information.”  State v. Travis, 832 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Wis. 2013). 
185 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 765. 
188 Id. (citing Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ind. 2010)). 
189 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 768–69. 
190 Id. at 768. 
191 Id. at 769 (“[T]his written advisement should inform sentencing courts of 
the following cautions as discussed throughout this opinion . . . .”). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 769–70. 
194 Id. at 753, 770. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\106-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 37 16-FEB-21 10:52
389 2021] POPULATION-BASED SENTENCING 
engage in population-based sentencing.  Though indirectly 
stated, this sentiment is best expressed in two passages from 
the Loomis decision.  First, the majority opinion suggests that 
judges, like correctional officers, may effectively “override the 
computed risk as appropriate” in line with the COMPAS user 
manual.195  Chief Justice Patience Roggensack more squarely 
takes on the task of characterizing judicial sentencing power as 
akin to passing moral judgment on an individual defendant. 
She concurs in the majority opinion to emphasize that the 
circuit court appropriately considered numerous sentencing 
factors, as underscored by the majority opinion.196  She adds, 
however, that courts should only “consider” COMPAS rather 
than “rely” on RAIs at sentencing because this would contra-
vene the defendant’s right to due process.197  In making a dis-
tinction between these two terms, the Chief Justice appears to 
be emphasizing a notion of judging that is distinct from popula-
tion-based sentencing.  It requires something more like taking 
multiple factors into consideration in social context, and less 
like processing a person in the abstract based on predeter-
mined factors and analysis. 
In a more recent case, the Iowa court of appeals grappled 
with whether to adopt the procedural rules declared in Wiscon-
sin in its own state. In State v. Guise, Defendant Montez Guise 
appealed from a sentence to incarceration because the sen-
tencing court referenced an actuarial risk assessment without 
the same warnings issued in Loomis.198  The appellate court 
overturned the sentence as an abuse of discretion because the 
actuarial risk assessment lacked transparency.199  While the 
Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that Mr. Guise failed to 
properly raise the appeal below,200 the dissenting opinions 
from the appellate court illuminate how those appellate court 
judges would adhere to the same approach as Loomis, without 
creating new procedural rules. 
195 Id. at 764. 
196 Id. at 773 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring). 
197 Id. at 774. 
198 State v. Guise, 919 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa App. Ct. 2018). 
199 Id. at *4 (“The [Iowa Revised Risk assessment] as described in Guise’s 
[presentence] report was a black box, devoid of transparency. . . . We vacate the 
sentence and remand for resentencing without consideration of the [risk assess-
ment] on this state of the record.”). 
200 State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Iowa 2018). 
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The dissents authored by Judge Christopher McDonald201 
and Judge Michael Mullins make the point.  In Judge McDon-
ald’s dissent, he suggests that “[d]ue process does not restrict 
district courts from considering risk assessment informa-
tion.”202  This holding, he explains, would be in line with Loo-
mis, which does not prohibit courts to consider the tools at 
sentencing.203  Moreover, Iowa sentencing practice and proce-
dure already makes it “impermissible for the district court to 
use any single consideration as a determinative factor in sen-
tencing.”204  Further, he rejects the claim considering the tools 
would be an abuse of discretion in the state because it is rele-
vant.205  Moreover, the tools themselves are not “sui generis 
and wholly beyond the comprehension of sentencing 
judges.”206  In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Mullins 
points to the heart of the matter when he reflects on the nature 
of sentencing.207  As he explains, an actuarial risk assessment 
is relevant and important in the state’s particular sentencing 
structure.208  Yet, it is in the nature of judging to “weigh[ ] the 
importance of relevant information and determin[e] what is 
most important in guiding or justifying a particular deci-
sion.”209  Though he does not use the words, his decision sug-
gests that the key to sentencing turns on considering various 
factors related to each individual defendant.210 
These cases illuminate two state courts grappling with the 
trend toward population-based sentencing and whether it re-
quires new procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to 
pass moral judgment at sentencing.  In Loomis, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court said yes.  In Guise, the dissenting appellate 
court judges said no.  Yet, in both instances, the opinions 
demonstrate judges questioning whether the nature of sen-
tencing has changed such that the courts are no longer able to 
pass judgment on individual defendants at sentencing.  They 
201 Judge McDonald has since been appointed to the state supreme court. I 
refer to him by Judge rather than Justice to be consistent with his role at the time 
the decision was issued. 
202 Guise, 919 N.W.2d at *7 (McDonald, JJ, dissenting). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at *11. 
205 Id. at *12. 
206 Id. at *9. 
207 Id. at *21–*22 (Mullins, JJ, dissenting) (noting that integrated features of 
Iowa’s sentencing structure between probation and incarceration). 
208 Id. at *20–*21 
209 Id. at *21. 
210 See id. at *21 (“I have long held the view that the sentencing process can be 
effectively understood as having three components: requirements, prohibitions, 
and discretion.”). 
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want to know whether a line has been crossed for judges in the 
realm of population-based sentencing. 
IV 
MAKING SENSE OF THE TENSION 
There is a deep tension between the courts’ techniques and 
the academic and policy-driven trend toward population-based 
sentencing.  This Part explains the tension.  It then identifies 
the peril and obscured promise this tension presents. 
The academic and policy-driven push to make sentencing 
an abstract endeavor based on population-based representa-
tions of crime and offenders exists in cross-purpose with the 
entire design of the sentencing process.  While the sentencing 
process is designed for individual judges to pass moral judg-
ment upon individual defendants, population-based sentenc-
ing concerns the individuation of sentencing outcomes based 
on abstract representations of crimes and offenders.211  While 
the language of sentencing remains the same, the institutional 
actors involved in sentencing remain the same, and the formal-
ities of the process for judge and defendant remain largely the 
same, the social and historical context of sentencing is 
changed.  To that end, academics and policymakers push to 
make the courts accommodate this trend toward population-
based sentencing by changing their role at sentencing, too. 
Rather than judge (or, for the moment, in addition to judging) 
at sentencing, scholars increasingly encourage the courts to 
211 See supra notes 42 and accompanying text.  Note, on this point, that I have 
not grounded my analysis on the right to be sentenced as an individual.  I have 
done this for three reasons.  First, the courts have not engaged with the trend 
toward population-based sentencing through the principle of individualized sen-
tencing. See supra subpart II.A; subpart III.A.  Second, “individualized sentenc-
ing” is itself a mutated concept such that the term does not really capture what 
makes sentencing different now for judges. GARLAND, supra note 9, at 179–80 
(explaining the trend toward punishment-at-a distance).  Third, following Profes-
sors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, individualization, along with notions of 
desert and fairness, reflect “different facets of the basic norm of equal treatment” 
central to the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. See Carol S. Steiker 
& Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 369 
(1995).  These principles extend to capital and noncapital sentencing alike. See 
Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1170 (2009). 
This article does not engage with the equality-based critiques of actuarial risk 
assessments. See supra notes 5, 20 & 75. 
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manage: manage the tools,212 manage offenders,213 and man-
age each other.214 
The courts have not embraced regulating population-based 
sentencing tools.  On this point, the federal guidelines are par-
ticularly instructive because, given their complexity and imple-
mentation, those guidelines represent the most explicit effort to 
push judges toward population-based sentencing.  Thus, 
Booker is most illuminating to this point.  There, the U.S. Su-
preme Court expanded procedural rights and simultaneously, 
effectively, took them away.215  Rather than create a world 
where individual defendants have more rights and the courts 
stop sentencing, it created a world where individual defendants 
have the same rights and judges can keep sentencing under 
population-based sentencing tools.216  In essence, what the 
U.S. Supreme Court did—and what it appears the state courts 
are trying to do—is to prevent population-based sentencing, 
even by just a hair.  So, as policymakers push states further 
toward population-based sentencing, individual defendants 
may get more procedural rights.  But eventually, the courts will 
create procedural rules to preserve the space for judges to con-
212 See, e.g., Slobogin, Principles, supra note 4 (proposing an evidentiary 
framework of fit, validity, and fairness around risk assessments at sentencing); 
see also State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 34 (Iowa 2018) (suggesting changes to 
sentencing procedure that would allow the courts to manage the parties to regu-
late actuarial risk assessments). 
213 See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 441–47 (encouraging the 
expansion of supervisory alternatives to prison sentences for judges to use with 
risk assessments at sentencing). In prior work, I have noted that the expansion of 
treatment programs for low-risk offenders, which appears non-controversial from 
a managerial framework, threatens to widen the net of people trapped in the 
carceral state, and can, unintentionally, sustain the prison population in the long 
run. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 
223–25 (2013) (warning that the managerial logic behind predictive risk assess-
ments and cost-efficiency driven sentencing reforms will not reduce mass incar-
ceration).  This article emphasizes that the whole nature of sentencing – not just 
what we do with defendants, but what judges are good for – shifts around the 
expansion of population-based sentencing tools, too. 
214 See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 479, 492 (suggesting that 
sentencing guidelines should be more binding when they incorporate risk assess-
ments and emphasizing the need for “increased scrutiny” where judges ignore risk 
assessments); Kevin R. Reitz, The Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclu-
sion in American Prison Policy, 38 BEHAV. SCI. L. 207, 207 (2020) (urging appellate 
enforcement of sentence outcomes on the basis of risk assessments) [hereinafter 
Reitz, Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion]. 
215 See supra subpart III.A (describing the Booker rule that federal sentencing 
guidelines are advisory). 
216 On this point, it is worth emphasizing that states did not have to follow the 
path set forth in Booker. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 286 (2007) 
(summarizing the options before the states when faced with the jury trial right 
problem in Booker). 
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tinue sentencing individual defendants in the face of popula-
tion-level tools. 
In short, the sentencing process is not likely to change 
much, at least not any time soon.  The courts are going to 
preserve the judge’s choice to pass moral judgment on individ-
ual defendants even though this is increasingly what policy-
makers do not want them to do.  And if they cannot do that, the 
courts will expand procedure in sentencing to make it increas-
ingly burdensome to engage in outright population-based sen-
tencing.217  What they won’t do—or at least have not done yet— 
is manage population-based tools through the sentencing pro-
cess. Yet this is exactly what advocates of the trend toward 
population-based sentencing want the courts to do. 
A. The Tension as Perilous 
This tension is troubling on several accounts, none of them 
new to sentencing.  Actuarial risk assessments do shape judi-
cial sentence determinations,218 just like sentencing guidelines 
have before them.219  By refusing to engage with the tools, the 
217 See id. (suggesting that states can either expand the jury trial right at 
sentencing or make their sentencing guideline structures nonmandatory to avoid 
the fact-finding concern explored in Blakely and Booker). 
218 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Ma-
chine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/ma-
chine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/S7X3-
9P9M] (providing anecdotal evidence of COMPAS risk assessment’s impact on 
judge’s sentence determination in Zilly case); Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. 
Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans 36–37 (Nov. 18, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3489440 [https://perma.cc/V8L2-CQ6C] (finding that, 
based on empirical research in Virginia, “judges’ decisions are influenced by the 
risk score” even though the tool is advisory in nature). 
219 For example, even after the Supreme Court jurisprudence rendered the 
federal sentencing guidelines advisory, judges continue to adhere to the tools at 
sentencing to varying degrees. See, e.g., Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing 
Disparity after Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2010) (despite finding 
an uptick in variances from the guidelines, concluding that many judges still 
adhere to the federal sentencing guidelines even after they were rendered advisory 
and suggesting that, among other explanations, this may be because some judges 
“actually agree with the Guidelines’ sentencing recommendations more often than 
their colleagues” or due to “institutional reasons, such as deference to the Com-
mission or a belief that the Guidelines carry democratic legitimacy”); Crystal S. 
Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines 
Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (2014) (finding an uptick in 
interjudge disparities after Booker and attributing at least some of that disparity 
to mandatory minimums); but see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Interactive Data Analyzer, 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/interactive-data-analyzer [https://perma.cc/ 
5UKG-A73A] (demonstrating that courts exercise the power to vary upward or 
downward from the guidelines after Booker about 20% of the time, while much 
more disparity in sentencing generates from government-sponsored motions). 
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courts legitimate their use whether judges can choose to sen-
tence on different bases or not.  If the courts do not regulate the 
tools, perhaps the tools will shape a judge’s thinking in the 
normatively “wrong” way.  Further, actuarial risk assessments, 
like sentencing guidelines, often lack meaningful judicial over-
sight in their design.220  Perhaps, by refusing to engage with 
the tools through the sentencing process, judges will be influ-
enced by a normatively “wrong” kind of population-based rep-
resentation.  Finally, the sentencing process, like much of 
criminal procedure, exists at cross-purpose with the underly-
ing rationales behind these population-based sentencing tools, 
which orient around prevention rather than culpability.221  If 
the courts do not engage with the tools, perhaps they will un-
dermine criminal administration in more problematic ways.222 
These concerns are compelling.  I leave it to others to continue 
exploring those possibilities in the literature in light of the con-
tinuities between actuarial risk assessments and earlier efforts 
to formalize judicial decision making around population-level 
representations of crimes and offenders. 
Situating these tensions in the frame of population-based 
sentencing, however, expands the frame of critique.  It creates 
a foundation to question not just the logistics of actuarial risk 
assessments at sentencing, but also the trend toward popula-
tion-based sentencing as a persistent, political choice.  To that 
end, perhaps the most perilous critique arising from the courts’ 
approach to population-based sentencing tools concerns the 
220 This concern is obvious in the context of many popular RAIs, whose propri-
etary nature obscures their design features. See, e.g., Nishi, supra note 67, at 
188–90 (urging judicial oversight in the design of actuarial risk assessments used 
at sentencing).  Yet even publicly developed sentencing guidelines lack judicial 
oversight in their design. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 40 (emphasiz-
ing that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 lacked a “provision for citizens or 
other affected persons to obtain judicial review of the final rules issued by the 
sentencing commission” analogous to the Administrative Procedure Act). 
221 Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness Cloaking Preventive Detention 
as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) (warning that reforms 
like mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines are driven by a logic of 
prevention at odds with criminal justice); Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 57, (2018) (noting the “significant fissure between principles restricting how 
risk is measured at sentencing and how risk is measured in actuarial sentenc-
ing”). See also Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive 
State, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 317–24 (2015) (explaining the theoretical tension be-
tween a “culpability conception of punishment” and “predictive restraints” based 
on prevention). 
222 See Goel et al., supra note 3, at 15–16 (raising the blameworthiness ques-
tion around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing). Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Pun-
ishment and Procedure: Punishment and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 
GEO. L.J. 775, 808-09 (1997) (suggesting that preserving blaming as a social 
practice should be protected). 
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phenomenon of mass incarceration, which RAI advocates fre-
quently invoke.  Despite modest reductions in recent years, the 
United States remains the lead incarcerator in the world.223 
RAI advocates suggest that this population-based sentencing 
tool is necessary to reduce incarceration safely, or at least it 
could help along the way.224  Perhaps, the argument might go, 
by preserving space for judges to keep sentencing on bases that 
are not population-driven, the courts contradict that socially 
beneficent end.225  That policy argument raises a question 
about what mass incarceration is, actually.  If the problem of 
mass incarceration is simply a quantitative matter of too much 
incarceration, perhaps the courts’ response is problematic.226 
If, as I believe, the problem of mass incarceration reflects 
deeper, structural issues in society, there is promise in the 
tension between the courts’ jurisprudence and RAI advocates 
aims, discussed below. 
B. The Tension as Promising 
The courts’ resistance to managing population-based sen-
tencing tools presents an interest convergence between the 
courts and the small, but fierce contingent of scholars and 
policymakers who oppose the expansion of actuarial risk as-
sessments at sentencing, and in criminal administration more 
broadly, for reasons to do with the structural realities of crimi-
nal law enforcement in the era of mass incarceration. 
223 WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERA-
TION: THE  WHOLE  PIE 2020 (2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ 
pie2020.html; E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2019 1 
(2020) (noting that the U.S. prison population has modestly declined since 2009). 
224 In identifying low risk defendants suitable for diversion from prison 
sentences, RAIs at sentencing may “conserve scarce prison resources for the most 
dangerous offenders, reduce the overall costs of the corrections system, and avoid 
the human costs of unneeded confinement to offenders, offenders’ families, and 
communities.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft 2017).  Advocates further suggest that the introduction of more consistent, 
transparent, and automated predictions of recidivism compared to clinical as-
sessments may reduce the threat of individual bias in judicial decision making. 
See id. Advocates tend to frame RAIs as an important component to reducing 
mass incarceration while maintaining public safety because the tools can identify 
those low-risk persons best suited for diversion from prison sentences. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 6B.09 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017). 
225 C.f. MEGAN STEVENSON & JENNIFER DOLEAC, AM. CONS. SOC’Y, ROADBLOCK TO 
REFORM 7 (2018) (suggesting that judges who do not follow RAIs recommendations 
at sentencing are frustrating the tools’ potential to reduce incarceration in 
Virginia). 
226 See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 259, 268–71 (2018) (distinguishing between “over” and “mass” crim-
inal justice reforms). 
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Every day, judges sentence individual defendants across 
this country. The state courts’ emerging jurisprudence right-
fully recognizes that sentencing has not been, and should not 
be, based solely on technical—nor subjective—assessments of 
recidivism risk.  At best, actuarial risk assessments provide a 
piece of information that may inform pursuit of the utilitarian 
aims of punishment, in particular incapacitation.227  Adopting 
RAIs into the sentencing process does not eliminate the other 
theories of punishment.228  More importantly, however, the as-
sessments do not account for the socially constructed dimen-
sions of crime or punishment.229  Judges can take account of 
these realities at sentencing, and they should be encouraged to 
do so. The sentencing process is designed for them to do so.230 
The courts’ jurisprudence around population-based sen-
tencing reflects a normative judgment about the nature of sen-
tencing.  If the U.S. Supreme Court had collapsed the jury trial 
227 RAIs are controversial in part because they only fit with utilitarian aims of 
punishment. See supra note 64.  As I have explained elsewhere, current RAIs do 
not accord with punishment theory, even incapacitation. See Eaglin, Construct-
ing, supra note 56, at 99–100.  For recent scholarship that explores the thin line 
between using RAIs to further rehabilitation and incapacitation at sentencing, see 
Collins, supra note 221, at 87–89.  For a critique of how the discourse between the 
diverging theories of punishment can encourage overpunishment, see Carol S. 
Steiker, Criminalization and the Criminal Process: Prudential Mercy as a Limit on 
Penal Sanctions in an Era of Mass Incarceration, in THE BOUNDARIES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 27, 49 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010) (“[B]oth retributivism and social welfare 
theory, as discourses deployed in the current world, will tend toward overpunish-
ment, even when policy makers and discretionary institutional actors self-con-
sciously and in all good faith see themselves as trying to promote their 
appropriate ends.”). 
228 See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (describing the dominant theories of punishment and noting 
the ascendance of utilitarian theories). 
229 Even a transparent, well-designed actuarial risk assessment cannot fully 
grapple with the realities of punishment in society because structural forces 
shape crime enforcement and so permeate the entire tool design process, from the 
selection of data to the selection of risk factors to the creation of risk categories. 
See generally Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56.  That RAIs eschew focus on 
social and governmental forces at sentencing is part of their problematic appeal. 
See Eaglin, supra note 8, at 534–36 (framing the tools as neorehabilitative and 
explaining how “the language of technical accuracy [around RAIs at sentencing] 
disaggregates crime from social and governmental forces and instead focuses on 
individual character and responsibility”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
230 As Professor David Garland explains, criminal justice decisions were un-
derpinned by a social style of reasoning for much of the twentieth century. GAR-
LAND, supra note 9, at 188. This would include the sentencing process that 
emerged in this time period. See supra subpart I.A.  An “economic” style of reason-
ing has emerged with the rise of population-based sentencing tools, which 
presents “crime as an externality of normal social interactions or which conceive 
crime as the outcome of reasoned, opportunistic choices.” GARLAND, supra note 9, 
at 189. 
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right into the guideline driven sentencing process, it would 
have tolerated more population-based sentencing, too.  The 
Court rejected that approach.231  State courts’ emerging RAI-
informed sentencing jurisprudence adopts a similar position. 
While individual defendants are not succeeding in their ap-
peals, state courts are using procedural challenges to further a 
vision of sentencing as a unique point in the criminal process 
where judges can pass moral judgment on individual defend-
ants.232  In so doing, they create the space for judges to “re-
sist[ ] the allure of (depersonalized) personalization” and, by 
default, assert the “sociality” of sentencing.233  From a perspec-
tive that considers standardization neither value-neutral nor 
inherently beneficial at sentencing, the emerging jurisprudence 
is worthy of further consideration.  The courts’ response to 
population-based sentencing tools “promotes a particular vi-
sion of society” and punishment distribution.234  That vision is 
deeply humanist. 
At the same time, scholars and policymakers persistently 
object to the expansion of RAIs in criminal administration for 
structural reasons.  RAIs produce racial disparities because 
they rely on historical data generated in a deeply racially and 
economically stratified society defined by an expanding 
carceral state.235  Common predictive risk factors like gender, 
age, socioeconomic status, and criminal history are far from 
objective in this sociohistorical context because mass incarcer-
ation disproportionately affects marginalized communities, 
particularly African Americans with less than a high school 
degree from urban centers.236  From this perspective, the indi-
231 See supra notes 149–64. 
232 C.f. Roberts, supra note 126, at 1722 (suggesting that the shortcoming in 
due process approaches to automated government decision making systems lies 
in the reality that “some government decisions should not be automated at all 
because automation itself makes adjudication undemocratic”). 
233 RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM 
CODE 17 (2019). 
234 Meares & Harcourt, supra 145, at 745. 
235 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk 
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 240 (2015) (analyzing the role of criminal 
history in actuarial risk assessments and concluding that “relying on prediction 
instruments to reduce mass incarceration will surely aggravate what is already an 
unacceptable racial disproportionality in our prisons”) [hereinafter, Harcourt, 
Proxy]; c.f. Devon W. Carbado, Blue on Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some 
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485 (2016) (describing a variety of social 
forces that make African-Americans vulnerable to ongoing police surveillance and 
contact). 
236 Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 527 (explaining that the 
factors used to predict recidivism risk “reflect the realities of social neglect and 
susceptibility to police surveillance”).  For a recent investigation of the impact 
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vidualizing emphasis on prediction, automation, and historical 
data collected in the era of mass incarceration as the method to 
reform sentencing is itself a problem.237  Encouraging the use 
of predictive tools that reflect problematic features of the 
carceral state threatens to further entrench mass incarceration 
as a particular mode of governance that operates to manage 
and control marginalized populations through the carceral 
state rather than offer support and resources outside it.238 
Moreover, it threatens to obscure through reform at the mar-
gins the deeper problem that this phenomenon reflects—the 
structural exclusion of marginalized people from society.239 
For opponents of RAIs in the era of mass incarceration, ex-
panding individual procedural rights cannot fix the structural 
problems that the tools expose at sentencing.240 
For the courts, actuarial risk assessments are problematic 
to the extent that advocates may use this population-based 
sentencing tool to frustrate their ability to pass moral judgment 
upon individual defendants in social context.  Though such 
conditions have not come to pass yet, there is very good reason 
to think that they will be used to that end, and soon.  For 
example, scholarship and public policy debates are starting to 
query how to make courts adhere to RAIs’ results more fre-
RAIs may have on Latinx people as well, see generally Melissa Hamilton, The 
Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Disparate Impact on Hispanics, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1553 (2019) (noting the dearth of scholarship exploring RAIs’ impact on Hispanic 
populations and demonstrating the issue through a study of pretrial bail algo-
rithms).  For a seminal study demonstrating the concentrated effect of mass in-
carceration on marginalized black communities, see BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT 
& INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (2006). 
237 Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 535 (critiquing the indi-
vidualist rhetoric of accuracy as a frame to engage with the expansion of RAIs at 
sentencing). 
238 Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, supra note 126 (arguing that RAIs 
“reflect and implement a carceral approach to social problems” endemic to the 
larger transformation of the carceral state upon which mass incarceration 
emerges). 
239 Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 536 (“To concede on the 
basis of politics to the expansion of risk tools threatens to mask the very difficult 
problems of historical change that create the foundation for their very expan-
sion”). Cf. BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 5–6 (warning that “the employment of new 
technologies that reflect and reproduce existing inequities but that are promoted 
and perceived as more objective or more progressive than the discriminatory 
systems of a previous era” are dangerous in part because “once something or 
someone is coded, this can be hard to change”). 
240 Roberts, supra note 238, at 1721–24 (illuminating the potential and limits 
of due process critiques of big data, and urging a more radical approach to the 
trend toward digitizing the carceral state); c.f. Paul Butler, Poor People Lose: 
Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2198 (2013) (warning that 
the expansion of criminal procedural rights are particularly problematic when 
critiquing the intersection of race, poverty and the carceral state). 
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quently. In a recent article, Professor Brandon Garrett and Dr. 
John Monahan suggest giving RAIs a “presumptive” effect at 
sentencing, so that more offenders’ sentences will turn on their 
risk scores.241  Professor Kevin Reitz urges something similar, 
querying how to get appellate courts to enforce sentencing 
rules based on actuarial risk scores.242  Policymakers, too, are 
exploring ways to make sentence outcomes accord with 
RAIs.243  In unison or independently, these developments may 
change the courts’ perspective on actuarial risk assessments at 
sentencing. 
Thus, between RAI opponents and the courts, an unlikely 
interest convergence is developing.244  The courts have an in-
terest in preserving the sentencing process, including the tradi-
tional space for judges to pass moral judgment on individual 
defendants.  To do that, they will need to resist the pressure to 
manage actuarial risk assessments through the sentencing 
process.  A way to do that is to resist the trend toward popula-
241 Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 479–80 (querying whether to make 
RAIs “presumptive” in effect at sentencing). 
242 Reitz, Compelling Case for Low-Violence-Risk Preclusion, supra note 214, at 
207–08 (suggesting that RAIs should be an important component to “presumptive 
decision rules that prohibit the imposition or continuation of prison terms for . . . 
carve-out groups” and urging appellate enforcement of such rules). 
243 MEGAN STEVENSON & JENNIFER DOLEAC, AM. CONS. SOC’Y, ROADBLOCK TO RE-
FORM 8-9 (2018) (reflecting on relationship between judges, actuarial risk assess-
ments, and decareral efforts); Evidence-Based Sentencing, CTR. FOR  SENT’G 
INITIATIVES, https://www.nscs.org/csi/evidence-based-sentencing [https:// 
perma.cc/B8GB-RDSV] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (encouraging RAI-informed 
sentencing for probation-eligible offenders).  Policymakers condition funding to 
state agencies based on adoption of actuarial risk assessments, though this prac-
tice has not been implemented in the context of state courts yet. See, e.g., OHIO 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM AND 
RISK AND  NEEDS  ASSESSMENT  TOOLS 2–3, (2015), http://ohiojudges.org/Docu-
ment.ashx?DocGuid=9e4c2814-6ffa-4018-9156-88fea13bf95e [https:// 
perma.cc/MZF2-Q54S] (warning that “reliance or non-reliance on risk assess-
ment tools should not be used to determine grant funding to courts” in response 
to passage of House Bill 86 in 2011); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.1111(d) 
(West 2020) (conditioning funding to correctional facilities on the basis of RAI 
scores in offenders). 
244 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“[T]his principle of inter-
est-convergence provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”).  Aya Gruber 
characterizes this principle in the context of sentencing reform as “the phenome-
non of racial justice remedies succeeding when they reflect the agenda of empow-
ered lawmakers and constituencies.” Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the 
Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2018).  To the extent that these 
tools are offered as a solution to reduce the threat of racial bias, actuarial risk 
assessments resonate of this critique.  However, this Article uses the term to 
illuminate a convergence of interests that may, quite unexpectedly, inure to the 
benefit of marginalized defendants. 
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tion-based sentencing.  The existing jurisprudence on popula-
tion-based sentencing demonstrates courts are inclined to 
adopt that route. 
That endeavor—of sentencing individual defendants in so-
cial context rather than engaging in population-based sentenc-
ing—is, in reality, a critique of the cultural and political 
assumptions that shape this historical present.  Actuarial risk 
assessments reflect the advance of a particular kind of abstract 
penal knowledge that only makes sense in a particular social 
context.  The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments 
at sentencing, even for the well-intentioned purpose of reduc-
ing incarceration in the states, not only extends the trend to-
ward population-based sentencing, but it also expands what 
Professor David Garland describes as the “culture of control.” 
As Garland explains, “the risky, insecure character of today’s 
social and economic relations is the social surface that gives 
rise to our newly emphatic, overreaching concern with control 
[in criminal administration] and to the urgency with which we 
segregate, fortify, and exclude [through the carceral state].”245 
The impulse to control sentence outcomes through technical, 
abstract representations is deeply connected to this social real-
ity, which encompasses the high rate of incarceration in this 
country, but really expands beyond it.  The tools only make 
sense if we are “increasingly less tolerant and . . . increasingly 
less capable of trust” in judges and the kind of contextualized 
penal knowledge they can produce.246  More recent critiques of 
actuarial risk assessments in particular expand upon this in-
sight by suggesting that population-based sentencing tools 
also make sense in a society committed to “acting without un-
derstanding.”247  This, too, is an extension of Professor Gar-
land’s culture of control, in the sense that the tools make sense 
in a society that is increasingly willing to create “new struc-
tures of controls and exclusions directed against those groups 
most adversely affected by the dynamics of economic and social 
change.”248  Challenging the assumptions that shape this pre-
sent, including those that create practices that disproportion-
245 GARLAND, supra note 9, at 194. 
246 Id. at 195. 
247 AAS, supra note 7, at 86 (suggesting that actuarial risk assessment “are not 
instruments for understanding, but instruments . . . that make it possible to act 
without needing to understand.”); VIRGINIA  EUBANK, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW 
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 176–78 (2017) (critiquing 
the turn toward technologies in the welfare space as propelling the “cognitive 
dissonance required to both see and not see reality”). 
248 Id. 
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ately, and adversely affect the most marginalized among us, is 
exactly what RAI opponents set out to do.249  Because the 
courts and RAIs’ opponents are most sensitive to these two 
trends, we might expect that at some point, their interests con-
verge.  This Article invites scholars to see the emerging sen-
tencing jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments in 
just such a light. 
That being said, if the courts are committed to preserving 
the sentencing process and the space for judges to pass moral 
judgment on individual defendants at sentencing, they will 
need to vindicate a qualitatively different kind of sentencing 
process grounded in active rather than passive judicial think-
ing.  For sentencing judges, it means explaining sentences on 
the record.  This kind of explanation does not mean simply 
stating that the court took other factors into consideration 
other than actuarial risk scores to avoid appeal.  Rather, it 
means bucking the trend toward population-based sentencing 
and explaining how the commission of this crime by this defen-
dant in this social context led to this particular sentence.  The 
point is not for courts to “override” an actuarial risk score with 
their own prediction of future behavior,250 but rather to engage 
with and ground a sentence in the rich sociological realities 
that illuminate a judge’s institutional expertise at sentencing. 
To that end, resistance also means exercising what Professor 
Carol Steiker has described as “prudential mercy.”251  Rather 
than grounding a notion of moral judgment in the competing 
theories of punishment, prudential mercy invites judges to 
pass judgment from a position of doubt and discomfort that 
punishment in the carceral state is appropriate in the era of 
mass incarceration.252  While conventional wisdom suggests 
249 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 238, at 1725 (“[I]mproving risk assessment 
procedures within multiple interlocking systems designed to exclude black people 
from social, economic, and political participation threatens to obscure these pro-
cedures’ antidemocratic functions and make them operate more efficiently.  The 
only way to address the digitized carceral state is to dismantle its social institu-
tions that enforce a racial caste system and reconstitute them in radically new 
ways.”); BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 11 (urging that we “pull[ ] back the curtain” 
on purportedly neutral technologies to “draw attention to forms of coded inequity” 
in the tools and in society). 
250 In fact, I would encourage judges to avoid the word entirely.  What a judge 
does at sentencing is far more sociologically situated than anything a tool can 
recreate. 
251 See Steiker, supra note 227, at 49–54 (describing the contours of a theory 
of prudential mercy). 
252 Id. at 50 (urging discretionary actors, including sentencing judges, to adopt 
“an openness to doubt whether even our best, good-faith attempts to translate 
punishment theory into practice will lead us astray [in the era of mass incarcera-
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that such doubt should be highest where risk is low, a decon-
structed and sociologically-rich account of the structural fac-
tors that produce recidivism risk invites judges to believe that 
such doubt may be highest where an individual defendant’s 
risk score is high.253 
Consider, as example, the sentencing of Eric Loomis.  Mr. 
Loomis, age 32, pled guilty to attempting to flee a traffic officer 
and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent as 
repeat offenses.254  The court sentenced Mr. Loomis to six 
years of incarceration in prison with reference to the COMPAS 
tool that characterized him as high risk of violence, high risk of 
recidivism, and high pretrial risk during his sentencing collo-
quy.255  We know that the court considered this offense as 
“extremely serious” and that it believed that Mr. Loomis drove 
the car while someone else shot a gun out the window.256  But 
the court did not explain why Mr. Loomis engaged in this be-
havior, and whether that should make him more or less culpa-
ble in this instance.257  We know that Mr. Loomis had a 
criminal history, including serving probation for delivering pre-
scription drugs in 2012.  But there is no reference to the struc-
tural lack of access to drug treatment outside the carceral state 
pervasive in Wisconsin due to state and local refusal to invest 
in such programming, including the southwestern part of the 
state from which Mr. Loomis hails.258  Such information con-
textualizes Mr. Loomis’s characterization as high risk.  For ex-
ample, the lack of access to such resources may relate to his 
criminal history, his history of drug addiction, and his sporadic 
tion], and a willingness therefore to moderate or even forgo otherwise authorized 
punishment, at least in cases where our doubts are strongest.”). 
253 For a recent, philosophically grounded argument that points to the same 
conclusion, see Christopher Lewis, Mass Incarceration, Risk, and the Principles of 
Punishment (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author). 
254 See supra note 119; see also Anne Jungen, Man Gets 8.5 Years in Drive-By 




255 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756 & n.18; see also supra note 183. 
256 Mr. Loomis contested this point. See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent in State 
v. Loomis, 2016 WL 485419 at *3–4 (Jan. 19, 2016). 
257 Instead, the court emphasized the need to protect the public, including 
that Loomis was high risk. See id. at *4. 
258 Parker Schorr, Across Wisconsin, Meth Use Balloons in the Shadow of the 
Opioid Crisis, WISCONTEXT (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.wiscontext.org/across-
wisconsin-meth-use-balloons-shadow-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/CL2Q-
6PDY]. 
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job history, too.259  These socially contextualized facts may of-
fer insight to how Mr. Loomis ended up driving the car on the 
night in question.  All of these sociological realities are cap-
tured in actuarial risk assessments currently used at sentenc-
ing, whether proprietary and publicly developed in origin.260 
When disaggregated from one another, these predictive risk 
factors paint a very different picture of this defendant.  By ac-
tively deconstructing the tools and analyzing their significance 
in creating the conditions under which Mr. Loomis conducted 
this crime, a judge might think more deeply about this defen-
dant in this case at sentencing.  Perhaps this analysis would 
suggest that Mr. Loomis’s case is one where the judge should 
doubt whether this extensive term of incarceration for this 
crime of conviction is the appropriate sentence.  Such an anal-
ysis also may not, in this case or others, lead to that conclu-
sion.261  Either way, it would substantiate the qualitatively 
different kind of sentencing process within which the lack of 
procedural rights makes some sense. 
To that end, appellate courts have an important role to play 
in this kind of resistance, too.  If the appellate courts are not 
going to manage population-based sentencing tools or expand 
procedural rights in the sentencing process, they, too, have to 
foster the qualitatively different kind of sentencing process 
where lack of procedural rights makes some sense.  Appellate 
courts can do this in a number of ways.  The courts should 
actively create a socially contextualized frame pertinent to the 
individual offender when analyzing the individual sentence. 
Rather than framing their opinions around the technicalities of 
the tools, the court could foreground the deeper analysis that 
sentencing judges do, or should do, at the start of their appel-
late decisions when reviewing a sentence where a judge consid-
ered an actuarial risk assessment.  These courts may also raise 
the voice of actuarial risk assessments’ opponents in the juris-
259 See id. (describing the experience of a Wisconsin woman who lost her job 
and spent time in jail waiting for access to a drug treatment program). 
260 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (listing common actuarial risk 
assessment predictive factors). 
261 Even if unequally distributed, contextualized mercy is better than no 
mercy at all. See Steiker, supra note 227, at 55–56.  To the extent that advocates 
already suggest that low-risk defendants should be diverted from incarceration, 
see supra notes 219–20, this approach would not contravene that impulse. 
Rather, it expands it while creating the foundation for the production of different 
social meaning from such efforts.  Jessica M. Eaglin, The Categorical Imperative 
as a Decarceral Agenda, 104 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–20 (2020) (critiquing the 
shortcomings of the efficiency frame in advancing decarceral sentencing reforms, 
including RAIs). 
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prudence.  Recent cases have done an excellent job in referenc-
ing the ongoing debates about the tools, including concern that 
they produce racial disparities.262  Yet courts will need to go 
further, by situating those debates within the review of a 
judge’s sentence for a particular defendant.  They could also 
ground their review of the sentence by referencing structural 
realities evident in a particular case and pertinent to the ongo-
ing debates. 
This avenue for resistance is second-best, and likely unsat-
isfactory to many readers.  This account generates from the 
social reality that population-based sentencing tools cannot 
escape the deep, structural inequities in society from which 
they emerge.263  There are other ways to engage with the design 
of actuarial risk assessments used at sentencing.  In earlier 
work, I have urged expansive transparency, accountability, 
and interpretability measures in the development and adoption 
of RAIs at sentencing that can address at least some of the 
procedural concerns that defendants raise in the courts at this 
moment.264  Central to that contribution is the notion that so-
262 See, e.g., Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 256, 268, 270 (citing to various legal 
articles regarding the design of actuarial risk assessments); Guise, 921 N.W.2d at 
31 n.1–2 (citing to various articles on actuarial risk assessments in criminal 
administration); Guise, 919 N.W.2d (same). 
263 Perhaps this means the problem lies in the courts’ unwillingness to engage 
with the equal-protection-based critiques launched at the tools. See Goel et al., 
supra note 3 (critiquing the Loomis court for avoiding the equal protection claim 
about actuarial risk assessments’ design); Huq, supra note 5, at 1055 (suggesting 
that actuarial risk assessments may be used if they are designed to counteract 
racial stratification); Starr, supra note 20 (“To be sure, the state has an important 
(even compelling) interest in reducing crime without unduly increasing incarcera-
tion.  But contrary to other commentators, I do not think this interest can justify 
the use of demographic and socioeconomic variables in [RAI-based sentencing].  A 
careful review of the empirical evidence and methods underlying the instruments 
show that their use does not substantially advance the state’s penological inter-
ests and that less discriminatory alternatives would likely perform at least as 
well.”).  I have my doubts on this point. See, e.g., Ben Green, The False Promise of 
Risk Assessments: Epistemic Reform and the Limits of Fairness, F.A.T. (Jan. 
27–31, 2020) (critiquing debates about actuarial risk assessment design and 
fairness in the context of pretrial bail assessments, and calling for epistemic shifts 
in the way we interpret the issue of algorithmic fairness).  Much more can be said 
on this topic, but it will have to wait for future work. 
264 See Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 110–21.  For example, I argue 
there that “state and local government bodies could create statutes or ordinances 
that require specific disclosures if the tools are used for the administration of 
justice.” Id. at 113.  Professor Aziz Huq makes a similar point when he urges the 
expansion of ex ante regulation to address constitutional and public policy con-
cerns raised by machine learning tools.  Aziz Z. Huq, Constitutional Rights in the 
Machine-Learning State, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1875, 1945 (2020) (suggesting ex 
ante adoption of tools that use “ ‘simple rules’ that perform (almost) as well as 
complex instruments yet are far more readily comprehensible.”).  This, in turn, 
would allow judges to deconstruct the tools when sentencing.  My point, again, is 
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ciety cannot adopt a passive role in response to the expansion 
of actuarial risk assessments as a key site in producing social 
knowledge used to distribute resources through criminal ad-
ministration.  I argue there that law must play an important 
role in facilitating deep contestation and engagement in this 
kind of knowledge production by grounding the design and 
adoption of the tools in normative, social values rather than 
technical ones.265 
This contribution builds from that observation, with a par-
ticular focus on the courts.  The nature of sentencing is chang-
ing, and courts must adjust.  Fundamentally, this 
transformation relates to the format of knowledge.  Though 
population-based tools make sentencing appear more formal 
and more abstract, judges are uniquely positioned to create a 
counterbalance when passing judgment on individuals at sen-
tencing.  They will need to produce narratives grounded in local 
knowledge that critique the systemic level representations of 
crime and offender.  They will need to embrace thinking about 
the structural context in which an individual appears before 
court rather than resigning to population-based representa-
tions as the only kind of knowledge that matters at sentenc-
ing.266  This kind of thinking is hard, but necessary.267  In the 
era of mass incarceration, sentencing constitutes an act that 
leads to the distribution of punishment; but it is also a key 
space where law engages in its sense-making function within 
society.268  From the narratives that a judge constructs in sen-
tencing colloquies to the written opinions produced by the 
higher courts, law shapes society’s “common sense” under-
standings of the world.  Through this kind of knowledge pro-
not to encourage judges to adjust their own prediction of risk by discounting 
certain factors included in a tool.  Rather, I encourage judges to seek understand-
ing, via the identification of factors used to predict risk, of the social conditions 
that may contribute to this defendant’s appearance before the court. 
265 Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 56, at 63–64, 107–07. 
266 See Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 501–02 (critiquing 
the technical orientation of debates about actuarial risk tools’ advance as lopsided 
and urging a turn to social transformation that sustain the advance of the tools 
and legitimate the expansion of the carceral state). 
267 See Cecelia Klingele, The Promise and Peril of Evidence-Based Corrections, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 580 (2016) (“If those in the criminal justice system do 
not consciously articulate the values that animate their use of state power, then 
the tools they use take on a life of their own, imposing bureaucratic values, such 
as efficiency and risk aversion, in place of the moral principles that have long 
justified the exercise of penal power.”). 
268 Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) (law 
exerts power “less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its rules 
than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and 
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person wants to live.”). 
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duction, the courts can actively contest the passive response to 
the expansion of technologies in the carceral state and the 
resignation to a status quo embedded within them.269  The 
population-based sentencing frame demonstrates that the 
courts can achieve this end not through intensive, procedural 
regulations of sentencing technologies, but through the pro-
duction of other narratives grounded in social rather than tech-
nical concerns.270 
To be sure, the courts’ approach to population-based sen-
tencing technologies does not guarantee that judges will adopt 
this active role.  At best, the jurisprudence creates the space for 
such analysis.  Yet, perhaps the space to embrace a different 
kind of penal knowledge at sentencing grounded in both “com-
passionate concern for the offender, rather than some more 
instrumental end” and sincere doubt about the expansion of 
the carceral state is a place to begin to think differently in this 
historical moment.271  Perhaps, by thinking about the tools as 
part of the larger trend toward population-based sentencing, 
judges will see the possibilities that lie in actively thinking 
about sentencing from a position of sincere doubt.  Perhaps, as 
the courts start engaging with actuarial risk tools from a posi-
tion oriented around their institutional expertise to sentence in 
social context, they can raise awareness to the larger, struc-
tural problems that need to be addressed in society.  Scholars 
and courts should further ponder these possibilities. 
On a deeper level, however, this Article places the jurispru-
dence around actuarial risk assessments in conversation with 
the jurisprudence that emerged around earlier population-
based sentencing tools to compel scholars to think more criti-
cally about how and why we as society are choosing to employ 
technologies at sentencing in this historically contextualized 
moment.  Individualizing, population-based technologies are 
expanding in criminal administration as “solutions” to issues 
that build from and reflect deep, structural problems at the 
intersection of criminal administration and society.272  The ex-
269 Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 486–87 (connecting the 
advance of actuarial risk assessments with transformations in social notions 
critical to sustaining the expansion of the carceral state). 
270 In this sense, this approach could embody a “demosprudence of poverty” 
that utilizes procedural due process challenges to “recognize substantive and 
structural matters of poverty while staying within the ostensible confines of cur-
rent doctrine.”  Monica Bell, Stephanie Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, To-
ward a Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 1477 (2020). 
271 Steiker, supra note 227, at 50. 
272 BENJAMIN, supra note 233, at 17. 
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pansion of such tools is not inevitable, and worthy of critical 
reflection in each space in which they appear.  In the post-
conviction sentencing context, the tools raise deep tensions 
that build from a long history of transformation to the nature of 
sentencing.  By preserving the sentencing process and the 
space for judges to actively pass judgment on individual de-
fendants in social context, courts remind us that this present 
does not have to be our present.  There are other ways to re-
spond to mass incarceration, and other ways to guide judicial 
sentencing discretion.  Judges surely need and appreciate gui-
dance to help inform their awesome responsibility at sentenc-
ing.  But why not provide guidance that plays to their 
strengths, like descriptive accounts of important sentence con-
siderations,273 rather than implement population-based tools 
that are more and more technical, more and more abstract, 
and less and less within the institutional expertise of sentenc-
ing judges?274  Why not address mass incarceration by invest-
ing in marginalized communities most affected by the 
phenomenon outside the carceral state, rather than investing 
in individualizing technologies to target them within it?275  Why 
not reduce long prison sentences through finite caps on sen-
tence length, rather than seeking to enhance social control over 
individual judges?276  These questions are both cultural and 
political.  If they appear beyond critique, it is because we make 
assumptions about what is possible in this historically-shaped 
present.  Quite unexpectedly, when viewed in the frame of pop-
ulation-based sentencing, the jurisprudence on actuarial risk 
assessments can sustain those deeper questions.  Engaging 
with those questions, in turn, creates the space to think differ-
ently about this present and, possibly, imagine different, more 
inclusive futures.  This Article invites others to consider those 
possibilities in light of this jurisprudence going forward. 
273 See, e.g., Alschuler, Failure of Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 42, at 
941–45. 
274 See, e.g., Garrett & Monahan, supra note 70, at 446, 488–89 (urging judi-
cial training on RAIs). 
275 See Eaglin, Technologically Distorted, supra note 8, at 541 (urging reflec-
tion on the relationship between actuarial risk assessments’ expansion and dete-
riorating social conditions for marginalized communities). 
276 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 233 (2017) (sug-
gesting a cap on prison sentences for all offenses and decriminalizing low-level 
offenses). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article situates the trend toward institutionalizing ac-
tuarial risk assessments in state sentencing processes as the 
extension of a larger trend toward population-based sentenc-
ing.  It connects the emerging sentencing jurisprudence around 
actuarial risk assessments at sentencing with the jurispru-
dence that developed around the federal sentencing guidelines 
in the 2000s.  By analyzing these seemingly disparate sets of 
case law in tandem, this Article illuminates how courts resist 
the trend toward population-based sentencing.  They expand 
procedural rights at sentencing and create procedural rules 
that preserve the space for judges to continue passing moral 
judgment on individual defendants.  This response exists in 
tension with the academic and policy-driven trend toward pop-
ulation-based sentencing.  Though this tension hardly offers a 
fix to the problematic implications of these tools’ advance, it 
creates the space to think differently about this current mo-
ment.  This Article invites scholars and courts to do so going 
forward. 
